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477 
ON THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 
POWER 
DAVID LUBAN∗ 
BRADBURY: Obviously, the Hamdan decision, Senator, does 
 implicitly recognize that we’re in a war, that the President’s war 
 powers were triggered by the attacks on the country, and that [the] 
 law  of war paradigm applies. That’s what the whole case was about. 
. . . .  
LEAHY: Was the President right or was he wrong? 
BRADBURY: It’s under the law of war that we . . . 
LEAHY: Was the President right or was he wrong? 
BRADBURY: . . . hold the President is always right, Senator. 
—exchange between a U.S. Senator and a Justice Department 
 lawyer1 
 
∗ University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University. I owe 
thanks to John Partridge and Sebastian Kaplan-Sears for excellent research assistance; to Greg 
Reichberg, Bill Mengel, and Tim Sellers for clarifying several points of American, Roman, and military 
history; to Marty Lederman for innumerable helpful and critical conversations; and to Vicki Jackson, 
Paul Kahn, Larry Solum, and Amy Sepinwall for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Finally, I wish 
to thank Georgetown law students Mark Aziz, Matthew King, and Anna Melamud for research 
assistance on the final version. 
 1. Justice Department Lawyer to Congress: ‘The President Is Always Right’ (C-Span television 
broadcast July 11, 2006), available at http://thinkprogress.org/2006/07/12/president-always-right 
(showing exchange between Steve Bradbury, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., Department of Justice Office 
of Legal Counsel, and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) during hearing on detained enemy combatant 
rights before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee). 
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Let no man be so rash as to suppose that, in donning a general’s 
uniform, he is forthwith competent to perform a general’s function; as 
reasonably might he assume that in putting on the robes of a judge he 
was ready to decide any point of law. 
—Dennis Hart Mahan, Professor of Civil and Military 
Engineering at West Point from 1832–18712 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE ILL-UNDERSTOOD COMMANDER IN 
CHIEF 
A.  THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration has 
made frequent dramatic appeals to the president’s commander in chief 
power, arguing that his decisions as military commander in chief in the 
global war on terror cannot and should not be second-guessed by the other 
branches of government. The “cannot” comes from Article 2 of the 
Constitution, which assigns the commander in chief authority solely to the 
president.3 Presumably this is what Mr. Bradbury, quoted in the epigraph 
above, means when he asserts that under the law of war the president is 
always right. The “should not” comes from elementary common sense. It 
seems self-evident that legislators and judges lack institutional competence 
to kibitz commanders about military matters. Their meddling would invite 
disaster. In its strong “cannot” form, the argument holds that it would be 
unconstitutional to enforce otherwise-valid laws that constrain the 
commander in chief’s pursuit of the war—a separation of powers argument 
for what has come to be known as the “commander in chief override” of 
other laws. In its weaker “should not” form, the argument holds that other 
branches of government, particularly courts, must adopt an extremely 
deferential stance toward the commander in chief’s decisions. Lawyers and 
legislators simply do not backseat drive on the battlefield. 
Perhaps the best-known example of the former argument appeared in 
the 2002 torture memo by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (“OLC”), leaked in 2004 just weeks after Abu Ghraib. In OLC’s 
words:  
 
 2. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 221 (1957) (quoting Dennis Hart Mahan). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
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Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield 
combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the 
Commander-in-Chief authority in the President. . . . Congress can no 
more interfere with the President’s conduct of the interrogation of enemy 
combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the 
battlefield.4  
Thus, federal statutes making torture a felony would be 
unconstitutional if applied to interrogations authorized by the commander 
in chief.5 Although the torture memo was withdrawn in the face of 
scandal,6 the opinion OLC substituted for it carefully refrained from 
commenting on its override argument, neither endorsing it nor repudiating 
it.7 But an earlier OLC opinion from September 25, 2001, which was never 
withdrawn, also asserts that the president has “plenary constitutional power 
to take such military actions as he deems necessary and appropriate . . . .”8 
Commenting on the War Powers Resolution and Joint Resolution passed by 
Congress in the wake of 9/11, that OLC opinion added: “Neither statute, 
however, can place any limits on the President’s determinations as to any 
terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the 
method, timing, and nature of the response. These decisions, under our 
Constitution, are for the President alone to make.”9 Thus, the commander 
in chief override argument still appears to be the Justice Department’s 
official position even after withdrawing the torture memo. Its theory 
appears to underlie signing statements the president has attached to 
legislation, declaring that he will construe provisions consistent with his 
constitutional authority as commander in chief, by which he evidently 
means that he reserves the right to disregard restrictions that in his opinion 
impinge on his commander in chief authority.10 
 
 4. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 
2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 207 (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS]. 
 5. The statutes in question are 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 6. See STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM 165, 
225 (2006). 
 7. “Because the discussion in that memorandum concerning the President’s Commander-in-
Chief power . . . was—and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that 
follows.” Memorandum from Daniel Levin to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), 
reprinted in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 361, 362 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006). 
 8. Memorandum from John C. Yoo to Timothy Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President 
(Sept. 25, 2001), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 4, at 1, 23–24. 
 9. Id. at 24. 
 10. For example, the president attached such a signing statement to post-Abu Ghraib legislation 
requiring safeguards to the independence of military lawyers. George W. Bush, Statement on Signing 
the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMP. 
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These are arguments about the president and the Congress.11 What 
about the president and the judiciary? Here, claims about the commander in 
chief’s power characteristically assume a different form. They are claims 
that courts lack competence to second-guess military commanders, and 
therefore courts should defer to wartime decisions by the commander in 
chief. In this form, the argument played a role in several decisions early in 
the war on terror, in which U.S. citizens who had been captured, then 
classified by the executive branch as enemy combatants, sought to 
challenge their detention. The district court in Padilla v. Bush, like the 
circuit court and Supreme Court in Hamdi, deferred to the executive branch 
determination that Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi were unlawful enemy 
combatants, because (in the Supreme Court’s words), “our Constitution 
recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of 
those who are best positioned . . . for making them.”12 In the same way, the 
U.S. District Judge determining that John Walker Lindh (a U.S. national 
who belonged to the Taliban) was unprotected by the Geneva Conventions 
wrote: “It is important to recognize that the deference . . . is appropriately 
accorded . . . to the President’s application of the treaty to the facts in issue. 
Again, this is warranted given the President’s special competency in, and 
constitutional responsibility for . . . the conduct of overseas military 
 
PRES. DOC. 2673 (Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.coherentbabble.com/signingstatements/ 
Statements/SShr4200.pdf. The same was true with the McCain Amendment, which forbids cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment of foreign detainees. George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the 
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html. On President Bush’s expansive use of signing statements, see 
Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1. 
 11. The most exhaustive and definitive discussion of the commander in chief override, and more 
generally the question of whether Congress can constrain the president in his warmaking capacity, is 
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the 
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) [hereinafter, Barron & 
Lederman, Framing the Problem]; David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at 
the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & 
Lederman, Constitutional History]. My own views are largely in line with those developed in Barron 
and Lederman’s two-part article, although our arguments and approaches are different. Very similar to 
Barron and Lederman is Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: 
Concurrent Power Over the Conduct of War (Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 74, 2007). 
 12. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004). See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 
606–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002). Although the Hamdi 
Court does find that Hamdi must be afforded process to challenge his detention, he gets a reduced 
process that “would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long 
as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.” 542 
U.S. at 534. Shifting the burden of proof in this way would provide “due regard to the Executive.” Id. 
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operations.”13 
And not just overseas military operations, because the Global War on 
Terror (“GWOT”) is unlike other wars. We fight it wherever the terrorists 
are, and the terrorists might be anywhere. They pick the battlefield, so the 
battlefield potentially encompasses the entire Earth. It follows that the 
commander in chief power, and the nearly unreviewable authority it 
encompasses, knows no geographical limits. For example, Padilla was 
arrested in a Chicago airport, yet the government subsequently asserted that 
this was not an ordinary criminal arrest of a U.S. citizen in the United 
States governed by constitutional criminal procedure.14 It was a wartime 
capture of an unlawful enemy combatant who could be held 
incommunicado for years in order to interrogate him and render him 
militarily harmless. What made it a battlefield capture was a determination 
by the commander in chief that Padilla, although a U.S. citizen, was also an 
enemy combatant on a military mission.15 Combining the authority of a 
battlefield commander with the expansive definition of the battlefield in the 
GWOT creates a vast scope of plenary power for the president. All of this 
purportedly follows from the constitutional designation of the president as 
commander in chief, combined with the bitter realities of the GWOT. 
Furthermore, the president’s decisions can fall under the commander 
in chief power even if they do not look like military decisions. Padilla, for 
example, was arrested by law enforcement officials, not captured by the 
military, and the conclusion about his enemy combatant status was drawn 
by civilian officials in the Pentagon.16 Determining what legal category 
applies to Padilla looks like a judicial job, not a military job. However, 
Judge Mukasey wrote in Padilla v. Bush that deference to the commander 
in chief 
 
 13. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 556 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 14. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564, 573–74.  
 15. Id. at 596–97. 
 16. See id. at 569. The evidence the government submitted consisted of an affidavit by a civilian 
official, Michael Mobbs, who was not made available for cross-examination. See id. at 572. A Mobbs 
affidavit was likewise the sole evidence the government presented against Hamdi. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002). Mobbs (a political appointee and former law partner of then-
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith) has no military experience and had not been in 
Afghanistan; his expertise was Russia, and his chief Pentagon responsibilities were planning on how to 
deal with oil-well fires in Iraq. See RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN, IMPERIAL LIFE IN THE EMERALD CITY: 
INSIDE IRAQ’S GREEN ZONE 35 (2006) (noting that Mobbs had not visited the Middle East); Bio: 
Michael H. Mobbs, FOXNEWS.COM, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,84942,00.html (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2008) (noting that Mobbs is a Russia and Eastern Europe expert). Thus, the connection 
between the courtroom evidence and military expertise or “the battlefield” was nil. 
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is due not because judges are not personally able to decide whether facts 
have been established by competent evidence, or whether those facts are 
sufficient to warrant a particular conclusion by a preponderance of 
evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Indeed, if there is any task suited to what should be the job skills 
of judges, deciding such issues is it. Rather, deference is due because of 
a principle captured in another “statement of Justice Jackson—that we 
decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not 
our competence.”17  
It is not the court’s commission to decide independently whether a captive 
U.S. citizen is indeed an unlawful enemy combatant, nor—more 
remarkably—whether the president “was in fact exercising a power 
vouchsafed to him by the Constitution and the laws.”18 Apparently, the 
commander in chief power includes the power to decide when presidential 
actions fall under the commander in chief power. If challenged in court, the 
executive needs to provide only “some evidence,” the lowest burden of 
proof;19 and this deferential stance toward the executive is actually less 
deferential than the government’s initial post-9/11 position that courts have 
no mandate at all to review assertions made under the commander in chief 
power.20 
B.  FUSED DOMINION 
Whether claims such as these arguments for judicial deference, or the 
commander in chief override, succeed depends on how extensive the 
commander in chief authority really is, and this Article aims to shed light 
on that question. The broader the commander in chief’s authority, the more 
plausible become the arguments for a commander in chief override and 
judicial deference to the president’s legal determinations about captives. 
The narrower the authority, the less likely it is that it can prevail over 
otherwise-legitimate actions by the legislative and judicial branches. One 
way of posing the question is to ask whether the commander in chief power 
includes the entire realm of national security decisions—that would, 
perhaps, be the broadest definition of the power—or nothing more than a 
narrow power of military command. Without an answer to this question, 
 
 17. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607–08 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 
(1981)). 
 18. Id. at 608. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing the government’s 
position). 
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assertions like Judge Mukasey’s about the president’s “commission” 
necessarily beg the crucial question of what that commission includes.21 
The Commander in Chief Clause itself gives away remarkably little. It 
reads: 
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into 
the actual Service of the United States. . . .22  
That is all. On its face, the clause tells us where the commander in chief 
authority is located: in the president. But the clause tells us nothing about 
what the commander in chief power encompasses. It names and assigns an 
office without specifying its functions.23 Nor does it tell us, directly or 
indirectly, what the political theory underlying the Commander in Chief 
Clause is or should be. The Commander in Chief Clause is a sphinx, and 
specifying its powers and the theory generating them is its riddle. 
All we learn from the words of the Constitution is that the highest 
military authority belongs to the highest civilian office: the chief executive 
and head of state is also the first general and first admiral. Let me call such 
combinations of military and civilian supremacy “fused dominion.” 
Historically, there is nothing exceptional about fused dominion. Quite the 
contrary: states throughout history combined political and military 
dominion in a single person. But, precisely because fused dominion 
appears everywhere, across wildly different forms of government and 
society, to say that the highest military authority belongs to the highest 
civilian office is to say very little. The meaning of fused dominion varies 
dramatically when we move from one system of government to another. 
Fused dominion characterizes the hero-rulers of epic poetry, ancient 
warrior-kings and warlords, feudal monarchs, and modern military 
dictators. Throughout humanity’s long and bloody history, political 
dominion went hand in hand with military prowess. In all such societies, 
fused dominion represented a consolidation of powers in a single 
individual. Whether consolidation meant that military prowess was the 
legitimacy condition for monarchy—the ancient model—or that civil 
 
 21. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 23. The torture memo asserts that “[t]he Framers understood the Clause as investing the 
President with the fullest range of power understood at the time of the ratification of the Constitution as 
belonging to the military commander.” Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, supra 
note 4, at 205. As we shall see, that is a deeply debatable assertion, and, in any case, it begs the question 
of what the fullest range of power understood at the time of the ratification actually includes. 
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authority was absorbed into military command—the modern military 
dictatorship invoking emergency powers or martial law—the 
consolidationist concept of fused dominion (as I shall call it) enhances the 
powers of one office by rolling in the powers of the other. 
But fused dominion also includes forms of government where civilian 
leaders whose own powers are limited control and check the military 
without functionally fusing with the military: the very arrangement that 
military dictatorships overthrow. Civilian control of the military grows out 
of a far different political theory than from consolidationism. The theory 
rests not on the need for a warrior-king but on the danger of military coup 
and military rule that an autonomous military might pose. Civilian control 
of the military goes together with other aspects of separation of powers, all 
of which are designed to use departments of government to check the 
power of other departments. It is, I will say, a separationist rather than a 
consolidationist theory. 
The U.S. Constitution is separationist in its conception of fused 
dominion, as I propose to demonstrate. It assigns the commander in chief 
power to a civilian office—the highest civilian office, to be sure, but a 
civilian office nonetheless. Military prowess is neither a formal nor an 
informal requirement of the presidency. Thus, if we ask whether assigning 
the commander in chief power to the president rests on an institutional 
competence argument, the answer is no. In fact, the separationist theory is 
in a crucial sense the opposite of an institutional competence argument. 
The purpose is to ensure civilian control of the military, and thus to wrench 
the commander in chief power out of the hands of the competent 
professionals (the generals) and put it into the hands of amateurs (the 
civilians). Conceivably, under some circumstances this arrangement might 
impede military effectiveness—whether it does is debatable—but a 
democratic republic may well think this a rational trade-off of military 
effectiveness for whatever political goods civilian government secures. 
This Article will examine the separationist and consolidationist 
theories, both theoretically and historically, to argue that in a democratic 
republic the most defensible version of commander in chief authority is a 
separationist conception that is far narrower than the Bush Administration 
believes. It was understood as a limited authority at the time of the 
constitutional framing, and the subsequent evolution of the U.S. military 
has not broadened it. 
The commander in chief authority is narrow in at least three ways. 
First, the Constitution hives off some key military powers, and assigns 
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them either to Congress or the states—clear structural evidence that its 
conception of civilian control is separationist. Second, the commander in 
chief power is assigned to a rule of law official, one who is charged by the 
Constitution to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”24 Third, the 
unformalized understanding of civilian-military relations from the founding 
era to the present has always been that the president should respect military 
professionalism. Civilian leaders should not micromanage military 
decisions. They need to monitor the military, for otherwise civilian control 
means nothing. But they should interfere only in circumstances when 
military strategy and tactics carry significant political consequences—for 
example, when President Truman overruled MacArthur’s aggressive 
strategy in the Korean War for fear that attacks on Chinese targets would 
bring the USSR into the war and escalate it into World War III.25 
This unformalized understanding of the president’s restricted military 
role is the most important interpretive guide to the cryptic Commander in 
Chief Clause. The consolidationist image of a civilian commander in chief 
is that of a hands-on, operational military strategist—a fighting president. If 
the point of the Clause is to endow a fighting president, the commander in 
chief power might well be taken as shorthand for a large and 
uncircumscribed set of executive war powers, the tools of the trade 
necessary for the commander to pursue a war design. That is implicit in Mr. 
Bradbury’s explanation that “the President’s war powers were triggered by 
the attacks on the country . . . .”26 
But the separationist image of the civilian commander in chief is 
totally different. For separationists, the point of the Commander in Chief 
Clause was never to install a civilian as master strategist. It was to ensure 
civilian control of the military as part of a system of checks and balances. 
No “war powers” beyond the narrow power of military command are 
implicit in the Commander in Chief Clause; the phrase “commander in 
chief” is not a synecdoche for anything beyond what it says.27 If anything, 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 25. See STANLEY WEINTRAUB, 15 STARS: EISENHOWER, MACARTHUR, MARSHALL: THREE 
GENERALS WHO SAVED THE AMERICAN CENTURY 447–54 (2007). 
 26. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 27. On this point, I may be in disagreement with Barron and Lederman, who believe “that the 
Commander in Chief Clause does confer broad substantive war powers on the President.” Barron & 
Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 11, at 770. They do acknowledge that the scope of these 
war powers is unclear from the text, and so the extent of our disagreement is uncertain. See id. Their 
term for what the commander in chief does is superintendence of the military. E.g., id. at 767. I agree 
with the connotations of this word, but it seems to me that superintending the military need not include 
broad substantive war powers. It does, no doubt, include powers to arrange logistics and training, as 
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it means less than what it says, because of the unformalized understanding 
that a military amateur should not make a habit of telling the professionals 
how to do their job, even if the amateur has the constitutional authority to 
do so. That is the well-taken point of the second epigraph quoted above, 
Dennis Hart Mahan’s warning: “Let no man be so rash as to suppose that, 
in donning a general’s uniform, he is forthwith competent to perform a 
general’s function.”28 As we will see, the warrior-king notion of fused 
dominion was already dying a century before the U.S. Constitution, as 
rulers gradually ceased being generals and generals abandoned their 
fighting role on the battlefield. 
One obvious reply is that looking only to the president’s personal 
competence in military matters takes the Commander in Chief Clause too 
literally. Plainly, presidents do not go it alone. Their military competence 
consists of the collective wisdom of the entire national security apparatus, 
which of course is formidable. 
This response does not relieve the difficulty, though. It will certainly 
not mollify separationists concerned about executive overreaching to be 
told that the commander in chief power requires deference to the president 
because he makes his decisions by consulting a large, secretive 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, nothing guarantees that the president’s decisions 
reflect the collective wisdom of expert advisors, because nothing obligates 
the commander in chief to heed anyone else. This point is by no means 
hypothetical, because there is substantial evidence (which I discuss later in 
this Article) that in both the run-up to the Vietnam War and in the current 
Iraq war crucial decisions were made by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Bush in conjunction with a small handful of civilian counselors, 
deliberately holding expert military advice at arm’s length.29 To cite an 
extreme case, journalist Bob Woodward reports that President George W. 
Bush asked for the opinions of only two people before deciding to go to 
war with Iraq.30 In any event, the less a president’s decisions pertain to core 
military functions, the less it matters that he is surrounded by military 
experts. As Judge Mukasey noticed, placing Padilla in a legal category 
based on evidence is not a uniquely military task, and there is no reason to 
 
well as the ministerial functions needed to run an army. But in my view, these belong to the narrow 
power of military command. 
 28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 266–78 and accompanying text. 
 30. BOB WOODWARD, STATE OF DENIAL 389 (2006). One of the two people was then-National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; Woodward does not name the other. Id. 
  
2008] COMMANDER IN CHIEF POWER 487 
 
suppose that generals are better at it than judges.31 
Finally, there is an important sense in which we must take the 
Commander in Chief Clause literally. The two things it unarguably does 
are, first, ensure that the military will have only one commander in chief 
rather than a collective commander in chief, and second, designate the 
president, personally, as the individual who holds that office. It is not an 
office that can be subdivided, and the question of whether it rests on 
institutional competence is ultimately a question about the individuals who 
hold it. 
Misunderstanding the theory behind civilian control of the military 
leads to legal mistakes, such as the commander in chief override, or the 
courts’ deference to the president on nonmilitary decisions, such as whether 
to classify U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, simply because the president 
is the commander in chief. But misunderstanding the theory may lead to a 
larger deformation in our political culture: an erosion of popular 
commitment to the rule of law in favor of militarism and militarist 
fantasy.32 After all, if a president struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
wrapped in the guise of a warrior, and represents his political decisions as 
military choices, he implicitly invites citizens to regard life as war and 
force as the first resort. He likewise invites them to tender the president the 
unquestioned deference due to battlefield commanders, and to redefine 
political opposition as subversion or disloyalty. 
But under our separationist conception, the American president is a 
politician supervising a professional military, nothing more. It is dangerous 
anachronism to invest this politician with the attributes of Alexander the 
Great or Cincinnatus. As Justice Jackson warned in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, it might lead us to mistake the commander in chief of 
the army and navy for the “Commander in Chief of the country, its 
industries and its inhabitants.”33 (Consider Marilyn Monroe’s nutty but 
culturally revealing explanation to her therapist of why she had an affair 
with President Kennedy: “Marilyn Monroe is a soldier. Her commander in 
chief is the greatest and most powerful man in the world. The first duty of a 
soldier is to obey her commander in chief. He says, ‘Do this.’ You do this. 
 
 31. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 32. For a masterful book on this theme, see ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN 
MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR (2005). 
 33. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643–44 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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He says, ‘Do that.’ You do that.”34) 
My focus is the commander in chief power, not executive power more 
generally. I do not propose to examine the president’s authority to conduct 
foreign affairs, even though it might be thought to subsume the commander 
in chief authority. Nor do I examine the much-debated theory of the unitary 
executive, which likewise might be thought to entail a broad commander in 
chief power because of the unitary executive’s supposed authority over all 
executive-branch agencies including the Defense Department. I ignore 
these broader questions because the commander in chief authority raises 
unique issues about civilian-military relations that cannot be settled by 
more abstract arguments about the scope of executive power. It would beg 
the question to derive conclusions about this uniquely problematic 
presidential power formalistically, by treating them as mere corollaries of 
grand unified-field theories of executive power. After all, it would be 
equally plausible to treat the president’s military powers as exceptions or 
limitations to theories largely tailored with other governmental functions in 
mind. The theology of the Vesting Clause holds no clues to the riddle of the 
Commander in Chief Clause. 
Understanding the commander in chief power will require a detailed 
historical inquiry—one that includes not only the question of what the 
founding generation thought a commander in chief does, but also broader 
questions about military history and the history of political ideas. For the 
notion of a civilian commander in chief is a political idea as well as a 
military one. The nature of military command has changed over time, and 
so has its connection with political leadership. Ultimately, though, the idea 
of civilian command grows from perennial questions about the relationship 
between a society and its warriors, and we must begin by framing those 
questions. 
In Part II.A I lay out the basic political theory behind civilian control 
of the military, and in Part II.B I survey some of the history (intellectual, 
political, and military) behind fused dominion. Part II.C examines the 
centuries-long process by which the roles of the ruler and the warrior 
separated from each other. One important conclusion is that this process 
had nearly run its course by the time of American Revolution, so that the 
consolidationist model of the warrior-ruler was already anachronistic. Part 
III demonstrates that the framers and ratifiers of the American Constitution 
were fully engaged with the problem of civilian control of the military, and 
 
 34. ‘I Have Control—Control of My Life,’ L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005, at A20. 
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accepted all the components of the separationist argument. 
In Part IV, I turn to the contemporary theory of civilian control of the 
military. Part IV.A argues that the three preoccupations of the framers and 
ratifiers—the dangers of military powermongering, the dangers of 
presidential abuse of military powers, and the dangers of military 
adventurism—remain today. Part IV.B demonstrates that the argument for 
separationism as the solution to these problems is likewise just as strong 
today. In Part IV.C, I consider the arguments of modern theorists of 
civilian-military relations. The starting point is Samuel Huntington’s 
famous reformulation of the issue in The Soldier and the State, as the 
problem of determining “the relation of the expert to the politician,” and his 
proposed solution, that civilian control requires “the maximizing of 
military professionalism.”35 Notably, Huntington criticizes the framers’ 
version of separationism. Nevertheless, Huntington’s approach insists on 
strong separation of the political and military functions, and that makes it 
fully consistent with separationism’s deflated, anti-heroic conception of the 
civilian commander in chief. 
In recent years, students of civil-military relations have criticized 
Huntington, and it will be necessary to examine their criticisms. Eliot 
Cohen, in particular, has defended a much more activist role for the civilian 
commander in chief—one closer to the Bush administration’s conception— 
and in Parts IV.D and IV.E I examine Cohen’s more consolidationist 
argument. I argue that the historical evidence Cohen offers justifies only a 
modest version of his thesis, namely, that civilian leaders should be active 
rather than passive interlocutors with their generals. That is entirely 
compatible with Huntington’s separation of political and military functions, 
as well as the proposition that the civilian commander in chief has no 
special military competence to which other institutions must defer. I 
conclude in Part V by returning to the dangers of militarism that arise when 
we invest the commander in chief’s role with overblown authority based on 
competencies the civilian leader does not possess. 
II.  THE IDEA OF CIVILIAN CONTROL 
A.  GUARDING THE GUARDIANS 
War goes back deep into human prehistory. Nine thousand years ago, 
Jericho already had elaborate defensive fortifications, and cave art shows 
 
 35. HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 20, 83. 
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bowmen fighting each other.36 Oetzi the Iceman, the Copper Age hunter 
whose freeze-dried mummy was discovered in 1991 in an Austrian glacier, 
died violently 5300 years ago, shot from behind with an arrow, wounded 
deeply on his hand, and bearing the blood of four other people on his 
clothes and weapons.37 Thus the oldest preserved European corpse was 
likewise the oldest preserved European casualty. Thomas Hobbes’s vision 
of the state of nature as a war of all against all may be historical fantasy,38 
but since history began to be recorded, war has always been one of the 
chief threats confronting every human society, and warmaking one of the 
chief occupations of young men in every era.39 Warriors pose the ultimate 
threat, but they also provide the necessary defense against that threat, and 
few societies have ever tried to do without them. Language itself reflects 
this necessity: as the classicist Arthur Adkins shows, the earliest recorded 
Greek usages of moral words such as “good,” “bad,” and “virtue” referred 
to success and failure at war.40 No human community could survive 
without its warriors, its guardians, and it is hardly surprising when military 
and community leadership fused. 
But who guards the guardians? Who is to stop them from tyrannizing 
their fellows, or ruining them through reckless military adventures and the 
pursuit of martial glory? That is the basic problem that civilian control of 
the military is meant to solve. We can see the importance of civilian control 
of the military by noting the ubiquity worldwide of military coups and 
military dictatorships. Of course, the framers of the U.S. Constitution did 
not know about modern-style military dictatorships. But, as we shall see, 
they understood the problems of military mutiny, dictatorship, and 
adventurism very well, and thought about them deeply. 
The narrowly formal point of vesting the commander in chief power in 
the civilian government is to insert civilians at the top of the chain of 
command, so that a soldier confronting orders from a mutinous general 
knows clearly that the civilian leader outranks the general in the military 
hierarchy. By itself, of course, this formality is a pretty flimsy bulwark 
 
 36. JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 119, 124 (1993) [hereinafter KEEGAN, HISTORY OF 
WARFARE]. 
 37. Ben MacIntyre, We Know Oetzi Had Fleas, His Last Supper Was Steak And . . . He Died 
5,300 Years Ago, TIMES (London), Nov. 1, 2003, at 30. 
 38. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Marshall Missner ed., Pearson Longman 2008) (1651).  
 39. On the early history of warfare, see KEEGAN, HISTORY OF WARFARE, supra note 36, at 115–
36. 
 40. See ARTHUR W. H. ADKINS, MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDY IN GREEK VALUES 31–
34 (1960). 
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against coups. Much more importantly, the constitutional vesting of the 
commander in chief power aims to establish a politico-military culture in 
which military coups become unthinkable, as they have been for the United 
States. 
But once the offices of civilian head of government and military 
commander in chief are fused (what I have called “fused dominion”), a 
complementary danger to military coups arises, namely that the leader will 
himself use the military to seize or abuse power or, just as importantly, 
launch military adventures. As I hope to show, the constitutional framers 
were acutely aware of these dangers, and in response they created a 
strongly separationist constitutional conception of the commander in chief. 
Justice Jackson got it right when he wrote in his famous Youngstown 
concurrence, “The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure 
that the civilian would control the military, not to enable the military to 
subordinate the presidential office.”41 
In brief, the basic theory behind civilian control of the military is to 
use a civilian commander in chief to check the military, and then set up 
civilian powers to check the commander in chief. Constraining the military 
and constraining the civilian commander are two distinct problems, strophe 
and antistrophe, and together their solutions generate the political theory of 
the commander in chief authority. 
B.  THE GILGAMESH PROBLEM: DOMESTICATING THE WARRIOR 
In heroic societies, “risk-taking validated rule.”42 This is military 
historian John Keegan’s explanation of why Alexander the Great always 
insisted on placing himself at the front of his armies, in the deadliest 
danger. 
For, however much his survival may seem to us necessary for the good 
government of the Kingdom of Macedon, a good but prudent king would 
have appeared both to him and to his followers a contradiction in 
terms. . . . [W]hat Macedonian worth the name would choose to be 
governed by a king who shirked risk in battle? The very means by which 
Macedonians endorsed the accession of a new king were military; his 
supporters put on their breastplates and ranked themselves at his side. 
When their number constituted a clear majority, the assembly signified 
acceptance of its will by clashing their spears on their shields. Military 
 
 41. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 42. JOHN KEEGAN, THE MASK OF COMMAND 143 (1987) [hereinafter KEEGAN, MASK]. 
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force thus validated his kingship; but he was thenceforth bound to 
validate his authority by an unrelenting display of military virtue.43  
In a society governed by heroic values, the only legitimate dominion is 
fused dominion. 
At the same time, though, fused dominion poses the oldest of all 
political problems: domesticating the warrior. In Gilgamesh, the earliest 
known story (2750 BCE), the eponymous hero, the king of Uruk, is both 
supreme warrior and supreme tyrant.44 He is “violent, splendid, a wild bull 
of a man, unvanquished leader, hero in the front lines, beloved by his 
soldiers . . . .”45 At the same time, 
The city is his possession, he struts  
through it, arrogant, his head raised high, 
trampling its citizens like a wild bull. 
He is king, he does whatever he wants,  
takes the son from his father and crushes him,  
takes the girl from her mother and uses her, 
the warrior’s daughter, the young man’s bride,  
he uses her, no one dares to oppose him.46  
The people of Uruk cry in distress to the gods, and in the remainder of the 
epic we witness the gradual taming and humanizing of Gilgamesh. At the 
end, filled with grief and defeated in his quest for immortality, Gilgamesh 
for the first time exhibits pride and pleasure in the city he rules. In the 
closing lines of the epic, Gilgamesh shows a visitor around his city, 
describing it in the identical loving, glowing words that the poet-narrator 
used to open the poem.47 
This is a personal, existential solution to the problem of domesticating 
the warrior, not an institutional one. It recognizes one of the permanent 
truths of human society: that war would not exist without the surplus 
aggression of young men, which only time and experience tempers. It 
recognizes as well that the same qualities that make a good warrior— 
 
 43. Id. at 123. “Alexander distinguished not at all between his role as ruler and his role as 
warrior. The two—in a world where states were held to be at war unless an agreement to observe peace 
specifically held otherwise, and in a kingdom whose court was also a headquarters—were identical.” Id. 
at 186. 
 44. STEPHEN MITCHELL, GILGAMESH: A NEW ENGLISH VERSION 69 (2004). 
 45. Id. at 71. 
 46. Id. at 72. 
 47. Id. at 198–99 (mirroring the description at 69–70). 
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violence, boldness, pride, charisma, love of glory—may make a bad king. 
But Gilgamesh gives no hint that the poet was thinking politically or 
institutionally about the problem. 
Nor was Homer in the Iliad. A famous passage describes the 
decorative artwork on Achilles’s shield, which depicts two contrasting 
urban scenes.48 The first is a peaceful one, with dancing and a wedding 
celebration, where the only sign of discord is a legal argument in the agora. 
The second depicts war, ambush, and siege. In it, even the attacking army 
is torn apart by dissension. The point of the contrast, which mirrors the 
larger themes of the entire poem, seems to be the incompatibility of 
warriors’ anger, pride, and violence with the peace and justice of civic life. 
In the Iliad, Achilles’s anger is “doomed and ruinous”; it “caused the 
Akhaians loss on bitter loss and crowded brave souls into the undergloom, 
leaving so many dead men—carrion for dogs and birds.”49 But in the Iliad, 
the warrior’s anger is a tragic inevitability: the passage I have just quoted 
concludes with the phrase “and the will of Zeus was done.”50 Homer 
starkly poses the problem of the undomesticated warrior, but he offers no 
solution beyond the deus ex machina, when Zeus commands Achilles to 
end his wrath and return Hector’s corpse to his grieving father.51 
Plato likewise offers no institutional solution to the problem. He 
recognizes that the qualities of a good warrior—a guardian—create a 
terrible problem for the political community: 
[W]ith such natures, how will they not be savage to one another and the 
rest of the citizens? . . . Yet, they must be gentle to their own and cruel to 
enemies. . . . Where will we find a disposition at the same time gentle 
and great-spirited? Surely a gentle nature is opposed to a spirited one. . . . 
Yet, if a man lacks either of them, he can’t become a good guardian.52  
Plato’s solution is rigid indoctrination, including the famous “noble lie”—a 
false set of beliefs designed to inculcate loyalty in the guardians by 
persuading them that, “as though the land they are in were a mother and 
nurse, they must plan for and defend it, if anyone attacks, and they must 
think of the other citizens as brothers and born of the earth.”53 Rather than 
building institutional structures to address the Gilgamesh problem, Plato 
 
 48. HOMER, THE ILIAD bk. 18, ll. 490–540 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Anchor Press/Doubleday 
1974) (n.d.). 
 49. Id. at bk. 1, ll. 1–6. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at bk. 24, ll. 139–44. 
 52. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 52 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1968) (n.d.). 
 53. Id. at 94. 
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aims to transform the warriors; but the dangers and difficulties of noble lies 
scarcely need to be pointed out. 
For an early example of an institutional solution to the problem of 
domesticating the warrior, consider the rules of kingship set out in the 
biblical book of Deuteronomy: 
If, after you have entered the land that the LORD your God has assigned 
to you, and taken possession of it and settled in it, you decide, “I will set 
a king over me, as do all the nations about me,” you shall be free to set a 
king over yourself, one chosen by the LORD your God. . . . [H]e shall not 
keep many horses or send people back to Egypt to add to his 
horses . . . nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess. . . . Thus he will 
not act haughtily toward his fellows or deviate from the Instruction to the 
right or to the left . . . .54  
Commanding less cavalry and treasure, the king will have less capacity to 
conquer and tyrannize. As Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit put it, 
“The biblical problem with a powerful person is how to prevent the 
tendency to self-deification. Therefore the rules concerning the king in 
Deuteronomy consist of conscious limitations on the concentration of 
power in his hands.”55 Here, the “constitution” of Israel builds in 
limitations on the king’s power, knowing full well the dangers of a 
powerfully armed king-general. 
Roman law likewise employed institutional solutions. The most 
famous is the prohibition on Roman generals marching their armies into 
Italy—“crossing the Rubicon,” the northern river establishing the boundary 
between Cisalpine Gaul and Italy.56 Likewise, generals were required to 
 
 54. Deuteronomy 17:14–20 (Jewish Publication Society). 
 55. MOSHE HALBERTAL & AVISHAI MARGALIT, IDOLATRY 220 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1992). 
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said, “This will be the practice of the king who will rule over you: He will take your sons and 
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tenth part of your flocks, and you shall become his slaves. The day will come when you cry 
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1 Samuel 8:10–18 (Jewish Publication Society). 
 56. This law is the lex cornelia majestatis. See Rubicon, in BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
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resign their office (yielding up their power, their imperium) before entering 
the pomerium, the sacred city boundaries of Rome.57 Roman republicans 
had no scruples about their officials exercising untrammeled violence to 
subdue Rome’s conquered subjects. But they feared despotism within 
Rome itself, and used the law—indeed, an early form of separation of 
powers—to create a firewall against it.58 
Fused dominion creates an additional problem besides military unrest 
and leaders’ will to power. Military heroes also crave adventure and glory, 
and their adventurism may be disastrous for their people. Adventurism, too, 
features in Gilgamesh, when the king decides to abandon Uruk to hunt the 
monster Humbaba in a faraway forest, so “the whole world will know how 
mighty I am. I will make a lasting name for myself, I will stamp my fame 
on men’s minds forever.”59 The city elders try to talk him out of it: “You 
are young, Sire, your heart beats high and runs away with you.”60 But 
neither the elders nor his friend Enkidu can dissuade Gilgamesh.61 
In heroic cultures and medieval Europe, royal adventures frequently 
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meant an absentee ruler, because the king led the troops. England’s King 
Richard I spent four years away on the Third Crusade, and Alexander the 
Great—who consciously modeled his career after the Homeric heroes— 
abandoned Macedon for ten years of campaigning.62 Adventurism has 
everything to do with personal ambition, and nothing to do with good 
government. As Keegan rightly observes about Alexander, “the perfection 
of his [military] performance should not blind us to the harshly limited 
nature of his achievement. He destroyed much and created little or 
nothing.”63 
Even when kings no longer marched with their troops or led them to 
battle, the problem of adventurism persisted. Leaders in all times and 
places have launched wars to aggrandize their power and make their mark. 
Sometimes they needed the wars to provide political distractions from 
domestic difficulties; sometimes, to give their restive troops something to 
do or get potentially mutinous soldiers out of the country.64 No matter what 
the reason for adventurism, wars have to be financed by the people, in taxes 
and the blood of their children; obviously, this is no less true today than it 
was in Alexander’s time. 
Immanuel Kant thought that checking adventurism was one of the 
most powerful arguments for republican government: 
If, as is inevitably the case under this [republican] constitution, the 
consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be 
declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in 
embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling 
down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting 
themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, 
painfully making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning 
evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debt which will 
embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the 
constant threat of new wars. But under a constitution where the subject is 
not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest 
thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow 
citizen, but the owner of the state, and a war will not force him to make 
the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and 
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court festivals are concerned. He can thus decide on war, without any 
significant reason, as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly leave it to 
the diplomatic corps (who are always ready for such purposes) to justify 
the war for the sake of propriety.65  
Perhaps Kant was thinking of his own ruler, Frederick the Great, who 
explained his unprovoked war against Austria thus:  
At my father’s death I found all Europe at peace. . . . Besides, I found 
myself with highly trained forces at my disposal, together with a well-
filled exchequer, and I myself was possessed of a lively temperament. 
These were the reasons that prevailed upon me to wage war against 
Theresa of Austria, queen of Bohemia and Hungary.66  
Sounding rather like Gilgamesh, Frederick added: “Ambition, advantage, 
my desire to make a name of myself—these swayed me, and war was 
resolved upon.”67 Throughout the middle ages, wars were fought as 
personal quarrels between rulers or other nobility, a pattern that did not 
begin to change until the devastating Thirty Years War and the peace of 
Westphalia.68 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the modern state 
had evolved to the point that wars were justified on impersonal rather than 
personal grounds, and rulers launching mere personal adventures began for 
the first time to be regarded as “little better than criminals.”69 Kant’s 
argument grew out of this understanding.70 
As befits a champion of enlightenment, however, Kant may have been 
too optimistic about the rationality of republican citizens. Compare his 
prediction that republican government will automatically curb adventurism 
with Hermann Goering’s perceptively cynical remarks to a prison 
psychologist at Nuremberg: 
 Why, of course, the people don’t want war . . . . Why would some 
poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he 
can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the 
common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in 
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America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after 
all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is 
always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a 
democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament, or a Communist 
dictatorship. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [V]oice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the 
bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they 
are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and 
exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.71  
As we shall see, reckless adventurism was an important concern of 
Americans in the founding era. Hostile Congressmen charged that 
President James Madison launched the War of 1812 for political distraction 
(what we now call “wag-the-dog” reasons): “a weak and wicked 
Administration . . . finding the confidence of the people withdrawn, and 
their power about to pass into other hands, have nothing to do but to 
declare war, and instantly all opposition must cease.”72 (Ironically, 
Madison himself wrote eloquently against military adventurism.73) 
Fused dominion was not a characteristic only of archaic societies. It 
persisted in feudal Europe. In historian Marc Bloch’s influential account, 
feudal organization originated as a military arrangement to defend against 
the Vikings from the north, the Magyars from the east, and the Saracens 
from the south.74 With the introduction of the stirrup in the eighth century, 
mounted shock combat became possible, and cavalry quickly emerged as 
the dominant military force.75 Cavalry requires grazing land, and the 
characteristic feudal institutions of subordinated layers of nobility who 
offer vassal homage—military services—to their superiors in return for 
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 72. 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 956 (1814) (statement of Congressman Miller of New York). For this 
and similar congressional utterances, see William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power 
to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 753–54 (1997). 
 73. See 15 JAMES MADISON, “Helvidius” No. 4, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 106, 108 
(Thomas A. Mason, Robert A. Rutland & Jeanne K. Sisson eds., Virginia Univ. Press 1985). See infra 
text accompanying note 207. 
 74. 1 MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 3–31 (L. A. Manyon trans., 1961) (discussing “Europe 
invaded and besieged”); id. at 145–56 (discussing the origin of vassalage relationships as forms of 
military protection). 
 75. See LYNN WHITE, JR., MEDIEVAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 27, 38 (1962). See 
also BLOCH, supra note 74, at 153–56 (connecting the introduction of the stirrup to forms of warfare 
and thence to forms of social organization). Cf. KEEGAN, HISTORY OF WARFARE, supra note 36, at 
285–86 (noting that while there is some debate on the origin of stirrups, their influence on warfare is 
undeniable). 
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land and armed protection emerged. This is what Keegan calls “the age-old 
connection between arms and landholding.”76 The medieval landholder was 
“a man whose power on the battlefield derived from his horse, his retinue 
of followers and the skill-at-arms they learnt while peasants laboured to 
keep them in leisure . . . .”77 Titles of nobility, like the fiefs that 
accompanied them, were awarded for feats of military prowess, and thus 
the hereditary aristocracy owed their estates to their ancestors’ battlefield 
successes.78 
In feudal cultures, just as in heroic cultures, military valor was a 
matter of honor for rulers, as illustrated by two remarkably similar stories. 
In the battle of Maldon in 991, Byrhtnoth, the Earl of Essex, rejected an 
easy tactic against Viking invaders—defending a narrow causeway they 
had to cross—because the Vikings challenged him to a fair fight. He 
allowed the Vikings to cross the causeway and form their ranks, after 
which they proceeded to kill Byrhtnoth and crush his army.79 Fifteen 
centuries earlier, Hsiang, the Duke of Sung, had faced a similar situation 
against his adversary at a river in central China, and did exactly the same 
thing as Byrhtnoth, with similarly disastrous results. The wounded and 
defeated Hsiang defended his decision. “When the ancients had their 
armies in the field, they would not attack an enemy when he was in a 
defile; and though I am but the poor representative of a fallen dynasty, I 
will not sound my drums to attack an unformed host.”80 For the feudal 
ruler, failure to exhibit military valor is failure to live up to the code that 
defines his class and legitimizes his claim to govern. 
C.  FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN FUSED DOMINION 
To describe fused dominion in heroic or feudal cultures is already to 
grasp the immense distance between then and now. Alexander the Great 
and Richard the Lion-Hearted may not have differentiated between their 
roles as rulers and warriors, but over the centuries those roles have become 
 
 76. KEEGAN, MASK, supra note 42, at 172. 
 77. Id. at 173. 
 78. See, e.g., ANNE CLIFFORD, THE MEMOIR OF 1603 AND THE DIARY OF 1616–1619, at 18 
(Katherine O. Acheson ed., 2007). 
 79. This encounter is memorialized in the eponymous Old English poem The Battle of Maldon, 
in THE BATTLE OF MALDON AND SHORT POEMS FROM THE SAXON CHRONICLE 1 (Walter John 
Sedgefield ed., 1904). 
 80. 5 THE CHINESE CLASSICS 183 (James Legge ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1960), quoted in MICHAEL 
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 225 
(1978). 
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almost entirely distinct. (I leave to one side victorious generals in civil wars 
or coups who install themselves as presidents.) With a few notable 
exceptions, they were already functionally distinct at the time of the 
American revolution: rulers had largely abandoned military command by 
the sixteenth century, and a century later even generals abjured fighting in 
the heroic style in favor of commanding from the rear.81 Gradually, 
generals ceased being fighters, and rulers ceased being generals. Thus, even 
when fused dominion remains a formal or constitutional reality, it was no 
longer a functional reality—not at the time the Commander in Chief Clause 
was framed, nor today. 
Let us review this development in a bit more detail. In brief, it grew 
out of four factors: (1) the increasing danger projectile weapons posed to 
rulers and other commanders fighting in the front lines; (2) the changing 
nature of armies as professional soldiers replaced feudal retainers; (3) 
evolving tactics that made heroic demonstrations of military prowess by 
leaders more difficult and less necessary; and (4) increasing demands for 
rulers to stay home and rule as principalities gave way to bureaucratic 
nation-states. 
The Age of Gunpowder emerged from the Age of Chivalry in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and even though gunfire did not become 
accurate at great distances until the nineteenth century, gunfire volleys 
could penetrate armor long before that.82 Indeed, even before gunpowder, 
the invention of longbows made it hazardous for the warrior-king to lead 
his troops. Regardless of his skill as a knight, he could be picked off by 
archers at a distance. In response, he commands from the rear, not the front, 
and increasingly he does not personally command at all.83 
Obviously, the danger of losing a king to battlefield death long 
predated gunpowder and longbows. Alexander, who always placed himself 
at the front of the charge, suffered innumerable wounds, including a nearly 
fatal arrow in the lung when he single-handedly leaped from the wall into 
an enemy city and was cut off from his men when the scaling-ladder 
collapsed behind him.84 But this was precisely the kind of heroic risk-
 
 81. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR 17, 39, 57 (1985) [hereinafter VAN CREVELD, 
COMMAND IN WAR]; VAN CREVELD, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 68, at 119–20. 
 82. See KEEGAN, HISTORY OF WARFARE, supra note 36, at 319–33; GEORGE QUESTER, OFFENSE 
AND DEFENSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 47–48 (2d ed. 2002); ROBERT ROUTLEDGE, 
DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 170–71 (14th ed. 1903).  
 83. See VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR, supra note 81, at 51. 
 84. KEEGAN, MASK, supra note 42, at 63; NORMAN F. CANTOR, ALEXANDER THE GREAT: 
JOURNEY TO THE END OF THE EARTH 133 (2005). 
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taking that galvanized Alexander’s army and legitimized his rule. Compare 
the fate of another ambitious young soldier-king, Sweden’s Charles XII. 
Charles, like Alexander, loved only war and not government—and died at 
age 36 in 1718 when a random shot found his head as he peeked over the 
lip of a trench during a siege.85 The difference was the crucial one between 
heroic death in combat and meaningless death at a distance, at the hands of 
an anonymous musketeer. Risking the former legitimated the hero-ruler; 
risking the latter did not.86 
The hazards of battlefield command in the Gunpowder Age are just 
one piece of a more complex story involving social, political, and military 
transformations. As the 1453 fall of Constantinople first made clear, walled 
cities and fortified castles were vulnerable to artillery.87 Henceforth, armies 
increasingly took the field to contest for open territory.88 As maneuver 
warfare became more important, and growing economies gave rulers more 
money, paid soldiers led by professionalized officers replaced feudal 
retainers.89 The very word “soldier” derives from solidus, a Roman coin 
whose name denoted the stipend paid to mercenaries.90 Likewise, 
“commissioned officer” originally referred to the commissions monarchs 
paid to the entrepreneurs who raised and equipped companies.91 
Mercenaries fought side by side with national armies until the time of 
Napoleon, with his mass conscription of citizen-soldiers.92 Frederick the 
Great’s army was half mercenary, and of course George III hired Hessian 
mercenaries to supplement British regulars in the American Revolution.93 
Tactics evolved as well. In the eighteenth century, the slowness of fire 
and inaccuracy of musketry led to a style of fighting with closely drilled 
infantry who fired off volleys in multiple ranks.94 Not only did the 
 
 85. See, e.g., R. NISBET BAIN, CHARLES XII AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SWEDISH EMPIRE: 
1682–1719, at 298–99 (London, Knickerbocker Press 1895); 1 CARLTON J.H. HAYES, A POLITICAL 
AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE 378 (1922). 
 86. “Since killing was now carried out at a distance by bullets that failed to distinguish between 
nobleman and commoner, it had in any case ceased being fun.” VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR, 
supra note 81, at 52. 
 87. See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 
79 (2002). 
 88. See id. at 80; VAN CREVELD, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 68, at 156–57. 
 89. NEFF, supra note 68, at 87–88. 
 90. Id. at 87; SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 64, at 29. 
 91. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 64, at 23. 
 92. See id. at 29; KEEGAN, MASK, supra note 42, at 175–76 (describing Napoleon’s citizen-
soldiers). 
 93. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 64, at 32–33. 
 94. See KEEGAN, MASK, supra note 42, at 131, 170–71. 
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Gunpowder Revolution make royal participation in battle more hazardous 
even at a distance, it also changed the nature of armies: now, skill with a 
hand weapon became less important than relatively unskilled soldiers 
laying down fields of fire. As a result, monarchs had less need to earn their 
armies’ respect and loyalty with demonstrations of valor, particularly when 
so many of the soldiers were foreign mercenaries with their own captains.95 
At the same time, the emergence of larger, more bureaucratic states made it 
increasingly imperative that rulers stay home and rule.96 A ruler who also 
happened to be a great general might occasionally take to the field to lead 
cavalry charges, but by doing so he risked the fate of Sweden’s Gustavus 
Adolphus, who was often wounded in combat and eventually killed at the 
battle of Lützen.97 
By the nineteenth century, rulers’ appearances at battles had often 
become purely symbolic.98 Even an experienced military man like Prussia’s 
King Wilhelm left the planning for the 1866 war of German unification to 
his chief of staff Moltke.99 Although the king accompanied Moltke to the 
decisive battle of Königgrätz, he and his retinue were “so much useless 
ballast,” who played no role in decisionmaking.100 And both Moltke and 
the king remained in the rear during the fighting, with little information 
about what was transpiring on the battlefield, and not much to do except 
forage for cigars in Bismarck’s humidor.101 
At the time of the American constitutional founding and even later 
there were occasional heads of state who commanded armies brilliantly. 
Frederick the Great—commanding from the rear—was the master tactician 
of his time, as Napoleon was of his.102 But these were rare. George II was 
the last British king to command troops in battle, in 1743 at Dettingen.103 
Although the 62-year-old George Washington led troops against the 
Whiskey Rebellion while he was president, he turned back before the 
 
 95. Id. at 122–26. 
 96. See VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR, supra note 81, at 39.  
 97. See KEEGAN, HISTORY OF WARFARE, supra note 36, at 341. 
 98. VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR, supra note 81, at 22. 
 99. Id. at 112, 115–32. 
 100. Id. at 132. 
 101. See id. at 137–38. 
 102. See id. at 62–64 (describing Napoleon as “the most competent human being who ever 
lived”); KEEGAN, MASK, supra note 42, at 30, 327 (describing Frederick’s mastery of the “Oblique 
Order” of attack, and Frederick and Wellington as “the masters of gunpowder warfare,” despite that 
Wellington lived half a century after Frederick). 
 103. HANNAH SMITH, GEORGIAN MONARCHY: POLITICS AND CULTURE, 1714–1760, at 106 
(2006). 
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action began.104 There is no evidence that Washington’s contemporaries 
thought leading troops is what presidents are supposed to do; and in fact, 
no president has done so since.105 A few decades after the Constitution was 
adopted, Justice Story wrote in his Commentaries, regarding whether the 
president would take personal command of the military, that “there was no 
probability that he would do so, except in extraordinary emergencies, and 
when he was possessed of superior military talents.”106 
To be sure, as late as 1765 William Blackstone described the British 
king as “generalissimo, or the first in military command, within the 
kingdom.”107 But this was merely a description of the king’s historical 
prerogative, as Blackstone makes clear.108 In reality, less than three 
decades later, England established a commander in chief post separate from 
the King, with the King’s posts as first general and admiral remaining in 
title only—what Huntington, borrowing Walter Bagehot’s terminology, 
calls a merely “dignified” rather than “efficient” title of government.109 
When modern rulers have played at being generals, the results were either 
 
 104. William Hogeland, Inventing Alexander Hamilton, BOSTON REV., Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 21, 24, 
available at http://bostonreview.net/BR32.6/hogeland.php. See WILLIAM O. STODDARD, THE LIVES OF 
THE PRESIDENTS: GEORGE WASHINGTON 298 (New York, White, Stokes & Allen 1886). See generally 
WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’S NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY (2006) 
(describing the history and motivation for the Whiskey Rebellion). 
 105. Huntington asserts that President Madison took a personal hand in organizing the defense of 
Washington, D.C. in 1814. HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 185. But this is not correct. Madison, 
together with several cabinet members, personally rode out to watch the Battle of Bladensburg five 
miles from the White House, and personally chewed out his secretary of war, General John Armstrong, 
for not helping General Winder organize the defenses. See Memorandum from James Madison on the 
Battle of Bladensburg (Aug. 24, 1814), available at http://www.constitution.org/jm/18140824_ 
bladensburg.txt (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). But Madison played no role in planning the defense (“The 
un-ruliness [sic] of my horse prevented me from joining in the short conversation that took place”), nor 
in the battle that followed, other than moving to the rear the moment fighting began and “leaving 
military movements . . . to the military functionaries who were responsible for them.” Id. Then, when 
the British routed the American forces, “I fell down into the road leading to the city and returned to it,” 
joining the headlong retreat that henceforth became known as the “Bladensburg Races.” See id. 
 106. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 328 
(Melvin M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1891).  
 107. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1COMMENTARIES *262. 
 108. Blackstone’s description of the king as “generalissimo, or the first in military command,” 
occurs in the chapter entitled “Of the King’s Prerogative.” The king’s prerogative, Blackstone explains, 
is “that special pre-eminence, which the king hath, over and above all other persons, and out of the 
ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity.” Id. at *239. 
 109. HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 187 (quoting WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER POLITICAL ESSAYS 72 (New York, D. Appleton & Co., rev. ed. 1893)). 
Great Britain abolished this separate post of commander in chief in 1895, but without restoring effective 
command to the monarch. Id.  
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ludicrous (the Czar and the Kaiser posturing in World War I)110 or suicidal 
(Hitler’s catastrophic conduct of World War II, when he made himself 
supreme commander, maneuvered battalions hundreds of miles away with 
no comprehension of the terrain they faced, and regularly overruled his 
generals, who sarcastically referred to him as the Gröfaz, a German 
acronym for “greatest field commander of all time”).111 The image of 
Lyndon Johnson poring over a map of Vietnam to choose bombing targets 
is not a pretty one.112 
To sum up, even at the time of the constitutional framing—and more 
so today—civilian leadership and military ability had lost their essential 
connection, even if civilian and military dominion remain fused as a matter 
of law. The connection between command ability and battlefield heroism 
had likewise eroded. Commanding generals no longer fight in person, and 
heads of state no longer general. Henceforth, the moral and political 
connections between heroic risk-taking in combat, effective military 
command, and political rule were snapped at both links. The premodern 
imagery of the hero-ruler still lingers in popular culture: presidents fight 
with their own hands in summer popcorn-fare like Independence Day and 
Air Force One.113 But the helmeted presidential candidate Michael Dukakis 
riding in an M1 tank, like George W. Bush landing on a “Mission 
Accomplished” aircraft carrier, dressed in a top-gun flight suit, were widely 
and justifiably criticized for photo-op fakery.114 
 
 110. See, e.g., DALE C. COPELAND, THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR 79–117 (2000); KING’S 
COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 80 (W.C. King ed., 1922); Proclamation, Czar Nicholas II to 
Grand Duke Nicholas (Sept. 5, 1915), in 3 SOURCE RECORDS OF THE GREAT WAR 320, 320–21 (Charles 
F. Horne ed., 1923). 
 111. The word Gröfaz abbreviates Grösster Feldherr aller Zeiten. RICHARD HUMBLE, HITLER’S 
GENERALS 3 (1974). See FRIEDRICH PERCYVAL RECK-MALLECZEWEN, DIARY OF A MAN IN DESPAIR 
174 (Paul Rubens trans., 1970) (sarcastic use of term by public); Dean Andrew, Strategic Culture in the 
Luftwaffe—Did it Exist in World War II and Has it Transitioned into the Air Force?, 4 DEFENCE 
STUDIES 361, 366 (2004) (sarcastic use of term by German officers). However, the origin of the phrase 
was not sarcastic: it was German General Wilhelm Keitel’s sycophantic description of Hitler after the 
fall of France in 1940. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL 
MEMOIR 353 (1992). For an illuminating discussion of Hitler’s “false heroic” commandership, see 
KEEGAN, MASK, supra note 42, at 235–310. 
 112. See ELIOT A. COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND LEADERSHIP IN 
WARTIME 175 (2002) (defending Johnson’s participation); PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: 
AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 172 (2003); DORIS KEARNS, LYNDON 
JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 330–31 (1976).  
 113. AIR FORCE ONE (Colombia Pictures Corp. 1997); INDEPENDENCE DAY (Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp. 1996). 
 114. Gideon Rachman, Defining Moment: Michael Dukakis and the Battle for Commander-in-
Chief, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2007, at 46 (“The image of Michael Dukakis posing in a tank must be a 
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One consequence of these transformations in the nature of command 
and rule is that vesting the commander in chief power in the president has 
precisely nothing to do with the president’s competence in military matters, 
either at the time of the framing or now. A corollary is that a common bit of 
rhetoric about why courts should not review presidential decisions in the 
GWOT—“courts must not second-guess the military on the battlefield”—
misses the all-important fact that while the president is supreme military 
commander as a constitutional designation, he is not a general and he is not 
on the battlefield. When the Fourth Circuit’s Hamdi opinion says “[t]he 
executive is best prepared to exercise the military judgment attending the 
capture of alleged combatants,”115 it is simply being anachronistic. The 
Supreme Court’s Hamdi opinion does no better. The Court states that “our 
Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in 
the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable 
for making them,”116 apparently not recognizing that “those who are best 
positioned”—military officers—and those who are “most politically 
accountable” for making them—elected officials—are not the same people. 
To support its assertion, the Court cites an earlier decision recognizing 
“broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a 
theater of war.”117 But, to repeat: the executive is not a military commander 
engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. The president is not 
commander in chief because of military prowess, but rather to ensure that 
military decisions are subject to civilian control. 
D.  MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS 
I shall say only a few words about the final form that fused dominion 
takes: modern consolidationism in the form of military dictatorship. As we 
have seen, fused dominion emerged in heroic and feudal societies because 
military prowess was thought to legitimize rule. This is not the case in the 
modern military dictatorship. After the collapse of fascism, modern states, 
including most military dictatorships, pay at least lip service to democratic 
elections, constitutionalism, and legal processes as the basis for a normal 
regime’s legitimacy. 
 
might have pondered this lesson before putting their man on an aircraft-carrier against the backdrop of a 
fate-tempting banner proclaiming: ‘Mission accomplished.’”); Bret Schulte, The Photo Op That 
Tanked, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 2008, at 51 (“The photo of Dukakis with a dopey grin and 
a huge helmet aboard a tank was turned into an ad ridiculing him as soft on defense.”).  
 115. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 116. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004). 
 117. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
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Military dictators draw their title to rule from the claim that an 
emergency has made a normal regime impossible, so the normal basis for 
legitimacy must be suspended. The name and model comes from the 
Roman institution of dictatorship.118 Ordinarily, the Republic was governed 
collegially by two consuls—a separationist institution.119 But in times of 
emergency, the senate could issue an emergency decree (senatus 
consultum) requiring a consul to appoint a temporary extraordinary 
magistrate, the dictator, who would exercise sole absolute power until the 
emergency was over, or six months lapsed, whichever came first.120 
Remarkably, only two dictators, Sulla and Caesar, prolonged their 
dictatorships past the six-month limit; and Caesar’s dictatorship was the 
end of the republic.121 
The modern dictator bases his military seizure of power on the claim 
that an emergency demands it. Coups take place in times of tumult—times 
of economic or political collapse, near-civil war, flamboyant corruption, 
labor militancy, or ethnic violence. Proclaiming a state of emergency, the 
modern military dictator suspends ordinary law and replaces it with martial 
law. 
The medieval archetype for martial law was a city under attack or 
siege, whose military commander would supplant the civilian government 
while the crisis lasted. The modern version began in 1811, when Napoleon 
proclaimed that he could henceforth declare a state of siege as a legal 
fiction, “whenever circumstances require giving more forces and more 
power to the military police, without it being necessary to put the place in a 
state of siege.”122 This état de siège fictif became the legal prototype for 
 
 118. Robert J. Bonner, Emergency Government in Rome and Athens, 18 CLASSICAL J. 144, 145, 
150 (1922). 
 119. See id. at 145. 
 120. Id. at 145, 150. 
 121. CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE 
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by emergency decree is not the dictator, but a different Roman legal device, the iustitium, in which a 
senatus consultum suspended the law and called on officials, or sometimes on the entire people, to 
defend the state by whatever means necessary. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 41–51 
(Kevin Attell trans., 2005) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION]. The difference, Agamben 
argues, is that the law continued in force under a dictator—although the dictator himself was not bound 
by it—whereas the iustitium established a “space without law.” Id. at 51. 
 122. AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 121, at 4–5 (quoting THEODOR REINACH, DE 
L’ÉTAT DU SIÈGE: ÉTUDE HISTORIQUE ET JURIDIQUE 109 (Paris, F. Pichon 1885)). 
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other nineteenth- and twentieth-century regimes of rule by emergency 
decree, still called “states of siege” in nations influenced by French legal 
theory.123 European countries made frequent use of the device in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries; France declared a state of siege from 
1914 until 1919,124 and Germany existed under emergency decrees through 
the final years of the Weimar Republic and the entire period of the Third 
Reich.125 The modern dictator seizes power and institutes the state of siege, 
typically promising a return to civilian normality at a time in the future 
when it is safe to lift the siege. 
Thus the principal difference between the modern military dictator and 
the heroic or feudal leader is that the modern dictator imposes military rule 
under the pretext that it is a temporary exception. The dictator’s claim to 
fused dominion is not that warmaking prowess legitimizes rule, but that 
civilian life has to be militarized for the duration of the crisis (which may, 
of course, last for decades). 
Carl Schmitt, the great theorist of dictatorship, famously wrote, 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”126 Schmitt’s epigram is 
notoriously slippery. Understood as a realist descriptive claim, it sounds 
plausible: anyone with the power to declare that the rules do not apply is 
the de facto sovereign. As a normative recommendation, it is the dangerous 
claim that in an emergency the sovereign has to be able to declare that the 
ordinary rules do not apply. (The Constitution is not a suicide pact.) If, in 
addition, the sovereign gets to decide what is or is not an emergency, 
Schmitt’s epigram becomes a recipe for dictatorship. And if the de jure 
sovereign will not or cannot deal with the emergency, the colonels or 
generals will seize power, and then, having decided on the exception, they 
become sovereign. 
 
 123. Id. at 4–10; Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege, 30 CAL. L. REV. 634, 638 (1942) 
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 125. Id. at 14–16. The device was an emergency suspension of constitutional rights under Article 
48 of the Weimar constitution. Id. at 14–15. For a survey of rule by emergency decree in France, 
Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States, see id. at 11–22. 
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But there is a deeper point to Schmitt’s epigram. Schmitt means to 
startle us with a paradox. Ordinarily, we think of the sovereign as a 
lawmaker: sovereign is he who decides on the rules. By insisting instead 
that the sovereign is he who decides on the exception, Schmitt in effect 
invites us to treat the exception—the crisis or emergency—as the core case, 
and the rule of law as a peripheral one. Rule becomes exception and 
exception becomes rule. This inversion is precisely the basis of fused 
dominion in military dictatorships. As the emergency stretches on, the 
temporary seizure of power by the strong man, who suspends rights in the 
name of restoring civil order, becomes permanent. 
III.  AMERICAN THINKING ABOUT THE GILGAMESH PROBLEM 
AT THE TIME OF THE FOUNDING 
A.  CONSTRAINING THE MILITARY: “A CAESAR OR A CROMWELL” 
At this point, I wish to examine American thinking in the founding era 
on civilian control of the military and what I have called the “Gilgamesh 
problem” of domesticating the warrior. This is not because I adhere to 
originalism; in any case, there are few areas of the law where originalism 
makes less sense than civilian-military relations. The differences between a 
few thousand musketeers and a military of over a million, garrisoned 
around the globe and backed by a thermonuclear force capable of 
depopulating continents in a matter of days, are simply too great. Nor are 
threats comparable, when a handful of terrorists can bring down 
skyscrapers with stolen planes, and a single child soldier with an AK-47 
can lay down more fire than a regiment of Napoleon’s infantry. It 
nevertheless seems important to understand what problems and 
preoccupations went into the constitutional design in order to know at least 
the broad contours of what the Constitution means by a commander in 
chief. Then we can turn to the present and judge which of the founding 
generation’s concerns have continued contemporary relevance. 
Recall the basic argument for a separationist conception of fused 
dominion: first, that civilian control of the military is essential to 
forestalling military coups and military rule; second, that civilian control, 
vested in the chief executive, generates the countervailing problem of 
ensuring that the president does not abuse his command, either by despotic 
rule or by military adventurism. Did founding-era Americans think about 
these problems in anything like these terms? The answer is decidedly yes. 
The founding generation had crucial historical examples of military 
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coups to ponder. There is, first, Julius Caesar, who crossed the Rubicon 
with his army and precipitated the civil wars that ended the Roman republic 
and made him the first emperor.127 
How did the framers think about Caesar? To answer this question, 
consider George Washington’s favorite drama, Joseph Addison’s 1713 play 
Cato. Washington saw the play several times, sometimes quoted it, and 
even had it performed for his troops at Valley Forge.128 The play contrasts 
the virtue of Cato, “the greatest soul that ever warmed [a] Roman 
breast,”129 with his mortal opponent, Caesar. Addison’s Caesar displays 
both of the great dangers of military rule: coup-mongering and 
adventurism. As for coups, one of his characters laments that “Caesar’s 
sword has made Rome’s senate little, [a]nd thinn’d its ranks.”130 And 
again:  
The Roman empire fallen! O curst ambition! 
Fallen into Caesar’s hands! our great forefathers 
Had left him nought to conquer but his country.131  
As for adventurism, we learn in the play’s opening speech that  
 Already Caesar  
 Has Ravag’d more than half the globe, and sees  
 Mankind grown thin by his destructive sword:  
 Should he go farther, numbers would be wanting  
 To form new battles, and support his crimes.  
 Ye gods, what havoc does ambition make  
 Among your works!132 
And, a bit later:  
 Alas! thou know’st not Caesar’s active soul,  
 With what a dreadful course he rushes on  
 
 127. Rubicon, supra note 56. 
 128. See Fredric M. Litto, Addison’s Cato in the Colonies, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 431, 441, 447 
(1966). 
 129. JOSEPH ADDISON, CATO, act V, sc. iv (1713), available at http://www.constitution.org/ 
addison/cato_play.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
 130. Id. at act II, sc. ii. 
 131. Id. at act IV, sc. iv. 
 132. Id. at act I, sc. i. 
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 From war to war. . . .”133  
Addison makes clear that Caesar’s flaws are not unique to his era: 
“Falsehood and fraud shoot up in every soil, [t]he product of all climes—
Rome has its Caesar.”134 
Washington was hardly alone in his fondness for Cato: it was the most 
popular drama in colonial America.135 Patrick Henry paraphrased 
Addison’s play in his “give me liberty or give me death” speech, and 
Nathan Hale did the same when he regretted that he had only one life to 
give for his country.136 In the infant republic, Noah Webster included 
verses from Cato in his reader for young people, which went through 
seventy-seven editions between 1785 and 1835.137 The play was admired 
for its models of sober, public-spirited republican virtue, but Garry Wills 
believes that the “influence of Addison’s play is probably to be sought less 
in any positive model it gave Washington than in what it warned against in 
verse after verse: Caesarism.”138 
To be sure, those who invoked Caesar’s ghost had in mind not only 
his imperial ambition and adventurism, but also his populist politics; the 
constitutional framers and debaters who feared excessive democracy 
regularly invoked Caesar to show what disasters populism brings.139 Thus, 
in a 1792 letter, Hamilton wrote Washington that “Cato was the Tory— 
Caesar the Whig of his day. The former frequently resisted—the latter 
always flattered the follies of the people. Yet the former perished with the 
Republic; the latter destroyed it.”140 This might indicate that when they 
 
 133. Id. at act I, sc. iii. 
 134. Id. at act IV, sc. iv. 
 135. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 44 (rev. ed. 
1992) (pointing to the “universal” popularity of Cato, and connecting it to Trenchard and Gordon’s 
Cato Letters, a major source of colonial suspicion of an unchecked military authority in executive 
hands); GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 137 (1984); 
Litto, supra note 128, at 442 (documenting Cato’s “transition . . . from pre-Revolutionary classic to 
instrument of rebellion”). Bailyn notes that while the colonists liked to pepper their writings with 
classical allusions, these frequently displayed their actual ignorance of the sources they were quoting—
the one exception being their serious knowledge of Roman history. BAILYN, supra, at 24–25. 
 136. Litto, supra note 128, at 443–46. When Cato’s dead son is brought before him, he says 
“[W]hat pity is it [t]hat we can die but once to save our country!” ADDISON, supra note 129, at act IV, 
sc. iv. 
 137. Litto, supra note 128, at 448.  
 138. WILLS, supra note 135, at 136. 
 139. See the passages indexed under Caesar’s name in M. N. S. SELLERS, AMERICAN 
REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1994). 
 140. Thomas P. Govan, Alexander Hamilton and Julius Caesar: A Note on the Use of Historical 
Evidence, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 475, 478 (1975) (quoting Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George 
Washington) (Aug. 18, 1792), in 12 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 252 (Harold C. Syrett & 
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invoked Caesar the framers were worried about popular democracy, not 
military coups. 
We should remember, though, that at a time when popular militias 
were the dominant American military institution, fear of populism and fear 
of rebellion could not be sharply distinguished. To see this, consider John 
Adams’s discussion of Caesar in his Defence of the Constitutions of 
Government of the United States of America: 
No military station existed in Italy, lest some general might overawe the 
republic. Italy, however, was understood to extend only from Tarentum 
to the Arnus and the Rubicon. Cisalpine Gaul was not reputed in Italy, 
and might be held by a military officer and an army. Caesar, from a 
deliberate and sagacious ambition, procured from the people an 
unprecedented prolongation of his appointments for five years; but the 
distribution of the provinces was still the prerogative of the senate, by 
the Sempronian law. Caesar had ever been at variance with a majority of 
the senate. . . . He had no hopes of obtaining from them the prolongation 
of his power, and the command of a province. . . . In order to carry his 
point, he must set aside the authority of the senate, and destroy the only 
check, the only appearance of a balance, remaining in the constitution. A 
tool of his, the tribune Vatinius, moved the people to set aside the law of 
Sempronius, and by their own unlimited power name Caesar as 
proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years, with an army of 
several legions. The senate [was] alarmed, and in vain opposed. The 
people voted it.141  
To Adams, at any rate, the fear that “some general might overawe the 
republic,” the destruction of checks and balances, and the danger of 
populism are nearly indistinguishable. To ask whether “Caesarism” meant 
popular democracy or military coups is to presume a false dichotomy. 
In addition to Caesar, an obvious classical model of the dangers of 
military coups was the Praetorian Guard, the Roman emperors’ elite force. 
Instituted by Augustus, the Guard repeatedly made and broke emperors. 
For perfectly valid reasons, the Praetorians assassinated the monstrous 
emperor Caligula and replaced him with Claudius, but that was just the 
beginning.142 Over the next two centuries (until Diocletian broke their 
 
Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1967). Hamilton repeated this analogy in his third Catullus paper. Id. at 478–79. 
 141. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 271–72 (London, Stockdale 1794) (1787). 
 142. On Caligula as a “monstrous” emperor, see C. SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, THE LIVES OF THE 
TWELVE CAESARS 435–38 (Loeb Classical Library 1913) (n.d.), available at http://penelope. 
uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Caligula*.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
On his assassination, see id. at 489–95. 
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power) the Praetorian Guard murdered or deposed approximately a dozen 
other emperors, and created or elevated about half a dozen.143 The military 
coup became one of the most persistent of Roman imperial institutions. 
But the framers had more immediate models of military coups and 
Praetorian guards at hand, drawn from the English civil war. The 
background lay in the fierce efficacy of Cromwell’s New Model Army, the 
first in English history to choose officers by merit rather than birth.144 
Formed in 1645, the New Model Army was responsible for the victory of 
the Parliamentarians over the Royalists.145 Once Parliament had Charles I 
in its hands, it tried to demobilize and disband the army—but the army 
resisted, in part because the troops had not been paid.146 The army’s radical 
members, influenced by the Levellers, promoted their own constitutional 
proposals at the Putney Debates of 1647, and in 1648 seized Charles as a 
bargaining chip.147 That same December, in Pride’s Purge, the army 
forcibly prevented antiregicide members of Parliament from entering 
Westminster, creating the Rump Parliament in order to ensure a favorable 
vote on whether Charles would be tried for treason.148 In 1649, the army’s 
Levellers staged an unsuccessful mutiny.149 Then, in 1653, Cromwell led 
his troops to Westminster and dramatically dissolved Parliament.150 For the 
next six years he ruled England as a military dictator, including fifteen 
months of strict military rule in 1655 through 1657.151 When Oliver 
Cromwell’s feckless son Richard became Lord Protector after Oliver’s 
death, the army removed him, reinstalled the Rump Parliament (1659)—
and then, when the Rump annoyed the army, dissolved Parliament again, 
leading within a year to the restoration of monarchy.152 In effect, England 
had witnessed five military coups and an unsuccessful mutiny in the space 
of fifteen years.153 
 
 143.  Conveniently summarized in tabular form at Wikipedia.org, Praetorian Guard, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praetorian_Guard (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
 144. See 2 SAMUEL R. GARDINER, HISTORY OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR, 1642–1649, at 196 
(Longmans, Green & Co. 1911) (1893) [hereinafter GARDINER, CIVIL WAR]. 
 145. Id. at 192; DEREK HIRST, ENGLAND IN CONFLICT, 1603–1660: KINGDOM, COMMUNITY, 
COMMONWEALTH 230 (1999). 
 146. HIRST, supra note 145, at 236–39. 
 147. See 4 GARDINER, CIVIL WAR, supra note 144, at 245–46, 254–60. 
 148. See HIRST, supra note 145, at 253. 
 149. Id. at 259. 
 150. See id. at 278. 
 151. See id. at 283–315. 
 152. See id. at 316–27. 
 153. For a detailed history of the English Civil War, see generally GARDINER, CIVIL WAR, supra 
note 144; SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, HISTORY OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND PROTECTORATE, 
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Not all these uprisings were sinister or dictatorial—far from it. The 
demands of the Putney Debates were for one-man-one-vote suffrage rules, 
and the Levellers advocated toleration, liberty, and economic equality.154 
Still, the English civil war offered an object lesson on the ability of an army 
to seize political institutions; and American framers had no sympathy for 
Leveller ideas. 
It might be thought that English history of the previous century would 
be of only marginal interest to the American constitutional framers. In fact, 
however, a revolt of angry, unpaid soldiers was hardly ancient history. In 
March 1783, only Washington’s persuasive power prevented mutiny in the 
Newburgh crisis, and three months later Congress fled from Philadelphia to 
Princeton after unpaid Pennsylvania soldiers surrounded the statehouse.155 
Alexander Hamilton was perhaps the most strongly pro-executive and 
nationalist of the constitutional founders. But even Hamilton, in The 
Federalist No. 21, warned against the dangers posed by 
“malcontents . . . headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell.”156 He twice 
warned Washington against Catalines and Caesars, and described Aaron 
Burr as “an embryo-Caesar in the United States.”157 Significantly, 
Hamilton appealed to the same historical analogies as the Anti-Federalist 
“Brutus,” who wrote:  
I firmly believe, no country in the world had ever a more patriotic army, 
than the one which so ably served this country, in the late war.  
 But had the General who commanded them, been possessed of the 
spirit of a Julius Cesar or a Cromwell, the liberties of this country, had in 
all probability, terminated with the war. . . .158  
Hamilton was warning about popular uprisings, Brutus about the national 
army; their arguments and politics were diametrically opposed. 
 
1649–1656 (AMS Press, Inc. 1965) (1901). 
 154. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS DURING THE 
ENGLISH REVOLUTION 92, 93 (1972). On the Levellers’ ideas, see id. at 86–120; on the radicalism of 
the New Model Army, see id. at 46–58. 
 155. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 143 (1996); Lawrence Delbert Cress, Republican Liberty and National Security: 
American Military Policy as an Ideological Problem, 1783 to 1789, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 73, 88 (1981) 
[hereinafter Cress, Republican Liberty and National Security]. On the Newburgh mutiny, see WILLS, 
supra note 135, at 6–9. 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 157. See Govan, supra note 140, at 477. It is evidence like this that makes Thomas Govan 
skeptical of Jefferson’s report that Hamilton idolized Caesar. See id. at 479. 
 158. Brutus, X, N.Y. J., Jan. 24, 1788, available at http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus10.htm 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
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Remarkably, though, they both used Caesar and Cromwell as symbols for 
military seizure of power. 
In short, at the time of the framing, Caesar and Cromwell stood as 
cautionary precedents of the danger of military coups and the importance of 
civilian control of the military. Perhaps because the danger was so obvious, 
the Commander in Chief Clause instituted civilian control of the military 
with virtually no debate at the Philadelphia convention.159 
B.  CONSTRAINING THE CIVILIAN COMMANDER: THE STANDING ARMY 
DEBATE 
What about the complementary concern—not fear of military 
rebellion, but fear of what the civilian commander in chief might do with 
the military? This played an even more important role in founding-era 
debates, preeminently on the question of whether there should be a 
standing national army, distinct from state militias. The very fact that this 
was a question may seem incredible from the vantage point of a nation 
whose current military outspends the next twenty countries put together.160 
But, as we shall see, the standing army debate was very much about fears 
concerning the oppressive and adventuristic possibilities of a commander in 
chief with his own troops. What to our eyes may seem a ridiculous issue 
was, in the eyes of the framers and their adversaries, fraught with meaning 
about states’ rights and the powers of the national government to work its 
will by force. 
The standing army would be a national army under the command of 
national politicians. By contrast, state militias would grow from local soil, 
with local roots and sympathies, and would supposedly serve as a check on 
the national government. Thus praise of state militias, like hostility to a 
standing army, should be read as tropes for fear of the oppressive 
possibilities built into federal control of the military; the arguments that 
publicists offered make this explicitly clear. These were mostly concerns of 
the Anti-Federalists, but some of the reassurances the Federalists offered in 
 
 159. “It is reasonable to assume that the commander-in-chief clause was noncontroversial because 
the Framers intended it to convey tightly circumscribed authority . . . .” W. Taylor Reveley, III, 
Constitutional Allocation of the War Powers Between the President and Congress: 1787–1788, 15 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 73, 113 (1974). 
 160. CHRISTOPHER HELLMAN & TRAVIS SHARP, CTR. FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-
PROLIFERATION, THE FY 2009 PENTAGON SPENDING REQUEST—GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING (2008), 
available at http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/fy09_dod_request_glo 
bal/. 
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rebuttal acknowledge the concern, although perhaps not sincerely. (Thus, 
for example, Madison responded to criticisms of Elbridge Gerry, a resolute 
opponent of strong national government, by saying that “as the greatest 
danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to prevent them by 
an effectual provision for a good Militia.”161 It is unlikely that Madison 
really thought the greatest danger to liberty comes from large standing 
armies.) 
Three background facts are important to understanding this debate 
(which today can only strike us as quaint and peculiar). First was the fact 
that in the founding era, everyone, Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, 
assumed that the bulk of national defense would lie in the hands of state 
militias rather than the national army, and that the militiamen would 
outnumber the army by a wide margin. George Washington proposed a 
standing army of 25,000, with 800 artillerymen, and a militia force of 
80,000—and Washington was among the framers most critical of militias 
and most in favor of a strong national army.162 In the War of 1812, 
militiamen made up 88 percent of American forces.163 By the Civil War, 
the militia system had deteriorated due to shirking and resistance—but the 
standing army was also small, at war’s onset only about 16,000 strong.164 
Indeed, for the first half of the nineteenth century the peacetime army 
exceeded 10,000 only twice, in 1816 and 1849.165 
Second, the American debate partly recapitulated a long-recurrent 
English aversion to standing armies, and a corresponding preference for 
locally raised militias that might defend against their excesses. In 
 
 161. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 388 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) 
[hereinafter Farrand]. 
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(noting a sarcastic quip by Washington in response to an advocate of a weak national army). 
 163. WILLIAM H. RIKER, SOLDIERS OF THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41 (1957). 
 164. On the deterioration of the militia system before the Civil War, see id. at 21–40; on the size 
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PRESENT: MILLENNIAL EDITION 5-354 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS]. 
 165. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 164, at 5-353. The size of the army spiked up during 
wartime mobilizations, including the War of 1812 (1812–1814), the Mexican War (1846–1848) and the 
Second Seminole War (1835–1842). See id. 
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Blackstone’s words, “In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make 
a distinct order of the profession of arms. . . . The laws therefore and 
constitution of these kingdoms know no such state as that of a perpetual 
standing soldier, bred up to no other profession than that of war.”166 The 
aversion arose initially from the oppressions carried out against Saxons by 
William the Conqueror’s soldiers; it was reinforced by the behavior of the 
mercenaries and impressed criminals who populated late medieval armies 
and routinely committed violence against civilians; and it was renewed 
during the revolutionary period, when Charles’s incessant demand for 
military financing was soon mirrored by Cromwell’s military 
dictatorship.167 After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament passed the 
Mutiny Act of 1689 to control the army, budgeting it on a year by year 
basis.168 
The aversion to standing armies was a recurrent theme among radical 
Whig publicists, including some who were widely read and quoted in the 
colonies and became staples of revolutionary and (later) Anti-Federalist 
thought. Algernon Sidney, for example, believed that corruption flows 
from the monarch and can best be counteracted by a strong and vital 
militia.169 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, two English journalists, 
published a series of letters in the 1720s that crystallized the concerns of 
radical English Whigs. Cato’s Letters were one of the most commonly read 
and cited works in the colonies.170 In the letter No. 94, Against Standing 
Armies, Trenchard and Gordon wrote: “They tell us that matters are come 
to that pass, . . . that we must submit to this great evil [i.e., a standing 
army], to prevent a greater: As if any mischief could be more terrible than 
the highest and most terrible of all mischiefs, universal corruption, and a 
military government.”171 Similarly, Trenchard wrote in No. 95, Further 
 
 166. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 107, at *408. 
 167. William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the 
Maintenance of Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393, 397–99, 402–04 (1991). 
 168. See id. at 405–06. 
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Militia, 40 J. OF HIST. OF IDEAS 43, 47 (1979) [hereinafter Cress, Radical Whiggery]. See also BAILYN, 
supra note 135, at 34–35 (describing Sidney’s great influence on the colonists). 
 170. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 135, at 35–36, 44; FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
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 171. John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, No. 94, Against Standing Armies (Sept. 15, 1722), 
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Reasonings Against Standing Armies, “[i]t is certain, that all parts of 
Europe which are enslaved, have been enslaved by armies; and it is 
absolutely impossible, that any nation which keeps them amongst 
themselves can long preserve their liberties.”172 
This is not to say that radical Whigs dominated the English debate. 
Adam Smith, for one, had no patience with the radicals, and argued that 
division of labor requires a professionalized army for the modern state.173 
Acknowledging that “[t]he standing army of Caesar destroyed the Roman 
republic” and “[t]he standing army of Cromwel [sic] turned the long 
parliament out of doors,” Smith nevertheless rejected the republicans’ 
charge that a standing army is “dangerous to liberty”; unfortunately, he did 
so only with the fatuous and unempirical rejoinder that making the 
sovereign himself the commanding general would alleviate his fears of 
revolt and make him more moderate and tolerant.174 (Mr. Smith, permit me 
to introduce you to General Pinochet.) 
Smith was not the only English defender of standing armies. As 
moderate Whigs recognized, the requirements of empire and the realities of 
modern warfare made standing armies indispensable.175 But relics of the 
political aversion remained. David Hackett Fisher writes: 
 As a social institution, the British army in 1776 was a bundle of 
paradoxes. Regimental badges and colors proclaimed that it served the 
king, but it was entirely the creature of Parliament. The army cherished 
its traditions but operated under a law called the Mutiny Act that expired 
every twelve months. The British people took pride in its achievements 
but deeply feared the power of a standing army and kept it on a short 
leash.176  
Third, and doubtless more important than these British debates, the 
King’s use of a standing army to subdue the unruly American colonies was 
bitterly resented, and appears among the grievances listed in the 
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Declaration of Independence.177 George III first stationed a standing army 
in America in 1763.178 This led to a series of inflammatory incidents: 
brawling between several thousand New Yorkers and British troops in the 
spring of 1766; smaller brawls with British troops in Boston in 1769, and 
the Boston Massacre in 1770.179 In response to the Intolerable Acts, 
Americans ratcheted up their rhetoric in criticizing the crown. Thomas 
Jefferson wrote that King George III had “no right to land a single armed 
man on our shores” and noted his concern that “his majesty ha[d] expressly 
made the civil subordinate to the military.”180 When General Thomas Gage 
was made governor of Massachusetts in May 1774, colonists witnessed 
fused dominion in action.181 Militia mobilization followed soon after, in 
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Virginia by January 1775; and the other 
colonies by autumn 1775. 
One might have supposed that the experience of the Revolution, when 
the Continental Army outperformed the unreliable militias, would have 
calmed concern about a national army, and indeed driven home to the 
colonists the need for a professional force; and that is certainly the lesson 
that the Federalists drew. Nevertheless, fear of an army remained, and at 
Elbridge Gerry’s proposal, the 700 Continental Army troops remaining in 
1784 were slashed to a custodial force of just eighty.182 (Later, debating at 
the constitutional convention whether the national army could be used to 
quell state rebellions, Gerry “was agst. [sic] letting loose the myrmidons of 
the U. States on a State without its own consent.”183) 
The fear that a standing army would empower a tyrant appears again 
and again in the ratification debates over the new Constitution. “A 
Democratic Federalist,” responding in the Pennsylvania Herald to James 
Wilson’s speech to the Pennsylvania legislature, inveighs against “a 
STANDING ARMY, that great support of tyrants . . . .”184 Centinel writes, 
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“A standing army with regular provision of pay and contingencies, would 
afford a strong temptation to some ambitious man to step up into the 
throne, and to seize absolute power.”185 The Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist 
Minority elaborates: 
A standing army in the hands of a government placed so independent of 
the people may be made a fatal instrument to overturn the public 
liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of the most 
oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures. 
An ambitious man who may have the army at his devotion may step up 
into the throne, and seize upon absolute power.186  
Brutus agrees: 
The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing army, not 
only because the rulers may employ them for the purposes of supporting 
themselves in any usurpations of power, which they may see proper to 
exercise, but there is great hazard, that an army will subvert the forms of 
the government, under whose authority, they are raised, and establish 
one, according to the pleasure of their leader.187  
Philadelphiensis writes, “Who can deny but the president general will be a 
king to all intents and purposes, and one of the most dangerous kind too—a 
king elected to command a standing army.”188 And Samuel Nason, 
speaking at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention on February 1, 1788, 
invokes Caesar’s ghost: 
Suffer me, sir, to say a few words on the fatal effects of standing armies, 
that bane of republican governments. A standing army! Was it not with 
this that Caesar passed the Rubicon, and laid prostrate the liberties of his 
country? By this have seven eighths of the once free nations of the globe 
been brought into bondage! Time would fail me, were I to attempt to 
recapitulate the havoc made in the world by standing armies. Britain 
attempted to enforce her arbitrary measures by a standing army.189  
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There is, to be sure, a great deal bordering on hysteria in these 
warnings, as Hamilton complained in The Federalist No. 29.190 Notably, 
however, the Federalists did not dismiss the worry; instead, they 
emphasized that the separation of powers will adequately guarantee against 
the tyranny of the commander in chief. George Nicholas, speaking at the 
Virginia ratifying convention, says, “The President is to command. But the 
regulation of the army and navy is given to Congress. Our representatives 
will be a powerful check here.”191 As for fear that the president will abuse 
his command of the militia, “No, sir, the President is not to have this 
power. God forbid we should ever see a public man in this country who 
should have this power. Congress only are to have the power of calling 
forth the militia.”192 To the Federalists, the power of the executive to abuse 
the standing army is a genuine problem, but one to which the Constitution 
provides an adequate institutional solution. 
C.  ADVENTURISM 
Finally, the constitutional debates of the founding era also registered 
concern about possible military adventurism on the part of a president with 
his own army.193 Several of the framers and ratifiers, both Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists, condemned the adventurism of European kings. Thus 
Hamilton, in the course of arguing that the new republic’s military 
expenses would be lower than in Great Britain, referred to “the ambitious 
enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy.”194 Jay observed that 
“absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get 
nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst 
for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private 
compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.”195 
The Anti-Federalist “Brutus” likewise noted that “[t]he European 
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governments are almost all of them framed, and administered with a view 
to arms, and war, as that in which their chief glory consists . . . .”196 All 
these warnings echo Montesquieu, who wrote in his chapter on war, 
“Above all, let one not speak of the prince’s glory; his glory is his 
arrogance; it is a passion and not a legitimate right.”197 Montesquieu 
cautions that when “principles of glory” direct the decision to go to war, 
“all is lost” and “tides of blood will inundate the earth.”198 
Recall Kant’s argument that the republican form of government was to 
be the cure for this infirmity. The Federalist writer “Foreign Spectator” 
wrote that  
military honor . . . is indeed very dazzling. . . . Yet this honor is not 
sufficient for republics, because it regards war rather as a theatre of 
glory, than a trial of patriotic virtue, and values a Caesar . . . [who] to 
astonish the world by his talents, became its conqueror, and the master of 
his own country.”199  
But Patrick Henry worried that even a republic might not be immune from 
adventurism: “The glorious republic of Holland has erected monuments of 
her warlike intrepidity and valor; yet she is now totally ruined by a 
stadtholder, a Dutch President. The destructive wars into which that nation 
has been plunged, has since involved her in ambition.”200 
The framers’ solution was not to rely solely on republican dislike of 
vainglory, but rather to remove the powers of declaring war and funding 
the military from the president to Congress. At South Carolina’s ratifying 
convention, Pierce Butler recalled that at the Constitutional Convention 
“[s]ome gentlemen were inclined to give this power [of making war or 
peace] to the President; but it was objected to, as throwing into his hands 
the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country 
in a war whenever he wished to promote her destruction.”201 And in a well-
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known 1789 letter to Madison, Jefferson wrote (in an argument reminiscent 
of Kant’s), “We have already given . . . one effectual check to the Dog of 
war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the 
Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.”202 
Some years later, Madison wrote to Jefferson, “The constitution supposes, 
what the History of all [Governments] demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is 
the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has 
accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the 
Legisl[ature].”203 
Perhaps the most thoughtful diagnosis of adventurism came from 
Adams, who grasped the psychological and political rewards that accrue to 
a war president. In his Discourses on Davila, written in 1790, Adams 
mused that “the man of spirit and ambition . . . looks forward with 
satisfaction to the prospect of foreign war . . . in which he may draw upon 
himself the attention and admiration of mankind.”204 And again: “With 
what impatience does the man of spirit and ambition, who is depressed by 
his situation, look round for some great opportunity to distinguish himself? 
No circumstances, which can afford this appear to him undesirable; he even 
looks forward with satisfaction to the prospect of foreign war . . . .”205 He 
went on: “The answer . . . can be none other than this, that, as nature has 
established in the bosoms of heroes no limits to those passions; and as the 
world, instead of restraining, encourages them, the check must be in the 
form of government.”206 
By 1793, Madison had already begun his turn away from support of 
strong central government. In his debate with Hamilton in the Pacificus-
Helvedius letters, he offered a warning about executive adventurism. It is 
worth repeating here, because even though it postdated the constitutional 
debate, it offers a late eighteenth-century statement about the evils of 
adventurism as forceful as Kant’s: 
War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war a 
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physical force is to be created, and it is the executive will which is to 
direct it. In war the public treasures are to be unlocked, and it is the 
executive hand which is to dispense them. In war the honors and 
emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive 
patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that 
laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to 
encircle. The strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the 
human breast; . . . the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in 
conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.207  
Nor was the warning an idle one. When Madison’s adversary Hamilton 
eventually saw his dream fulfilled of a standing army with himself as its 
inspector-general, he promptly devised what his biographer Ron Chernow 
calls “a harebrained scheme” to invade Latin America.208 
D.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESULT 
In short, all components of the argument for separationist civilian 
control of the military were alive and in play during the framing and 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution. The danger of a military mutiny, as 
exemplified by Caesar and Cromwell, and nearly experienced at Newburgh 
and Philadelphia, was well understood. The countervailing danger that a 
civilian leader of a standing army might use it to abuse or seize power was 
familiar from British debates and colonial experience. Even if Federalists 
regarded Anti-Federalists harping on this theme as absurd alarmists, the 
argument was one they responded to seriously. 
How were these concerns reflected in the Constitution that resulted? A 
brief canvass will suffice to show how the framers of the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights created a separationist structure to keep the president’s 
war powers in check.209 First, and most obviously, the Constitution hives 
off important powers of war and peace from the executive and gives them 
to Congress: 
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use 
shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
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To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces; 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; . . . .210  
There is, of course, a vigorous debate of long standing over whether the 
congressional power to declare war leaves the president free to launch 
undeclared wars; there is no need to review that debate here.211 For our 
purposes, the most important point to note about these clauses, other than 
that they represent significant powers over the military given to Congress 
rather than the executive, is that where Great Britain’s Mutiny Act put the 
British army on one-year funding cycles, the framers loosened the tethers 
slightly by expanding the cycle to two years. But the tether remains. It is 
also important to notice that the power to call out the militia rests with 
Congress rather than the president (although in the Militia Act of 1792 
Congress gave part of the power back to the president, by authorizing him 
to call out the militia “whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in 
imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe.”)212 
Second, the Constitution takes great care to ensure that the president 
cannot pack the militias with his own chosen officers; those appointments, 
along with the authority to train the militias, are left to the states: 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the 
United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the 
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress.213  
Given the preeminent military role that the framers anticipated for the 
militias, this set a major roadblock to any president’s efforts to centralize 
military force under his personal command.214 A parallel precaution lies in 
the Article 2 Appointments Clause requirement of Senate advice and 
consent for appointments of federal officers, which by subsequent law 
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includes generals.215 The Second and Third Amendments, forbidding the 
government from disarming militiamen and from quartering federal troops 
in private homes during peacetime, offer further safeguards against the 
kinds of abuse of standing armies that the Anti-Federalists feared.216 And 
Congress’s constitutional authority includes “governing” as well as 
disciplining the militia when it is called into national service. That gives 
Congress a power parallel to that provided over the federal army and navy 
by the Government and Regulation clause: it is Congress, not the president, 
that writes the rules governing the militias. 
A more subtle check on military power is the Incompatibility Clause 
of Article 1, section 6, which ensures the civilian character of the 
legislature by forbidding sitting senators and representatives from 
simultaneously serving in any other federal office, including military 
office.217 
The same is not true of the president, however, and this shows the 
limits to which the framers were willing to go in demilitarizing the 
presidency. There is no constitutional bar to a serving military officer being 
president. Nor is the president’s role as commander in chief merely 
“dignified.” While some of the Anti-Federalists argued against permitting 
the president to command troops in the field, they lost that fight.218 Even 
Hamilton’s proposal that the president “shall have the direction of war 
when commenced, but he shall not take the actual command in the field of 
an army without the consent of the Senate and Assembly” is not reflected 
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in the final product.219 Perhaps with a future President Washington in mind, 
the framers left open the possibility of a president on horseback taking 
effective command of troops. Obviously, it does not follow that they 
expected presidents to command troops in the field; Justice Story’s 
previously quoted judgment that “there was no probability that he would do 
so, except in extraordinary emergencies, and when he was possessed of 
superior military talents” accurately interprets both the state of warfare in 
1789 and the import of the constitutional debate.220 
One last constitutional provision is significant. That is the Take Care 
Clause of Article II, section 3, which, by requiring that the president “take 
[c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed,” insists that the president 
remains at bottom a rule of law official.221 There is no hint in either the text 
or debates that this duty ceases when presidents act in their capacity as 
commander in chief. 
The subsequent jurisprudence of the Take Care Clause is complex, 
and deals with issues that the framers and ratifiers never debated, and most 
likely never even considered.222 For our purposes, however, the central 
point is simple: the Take Care Clause emphasizes the primacy of the 
president’s civilian, rule-of-law, office over his military one. Military 
commanders, after all, do not have a duty to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. Of course, they are not supposed to violate the laws of 
war or permit their troops to do so. But their basic job is to win wars, not 
execute laws. The battlefield, their arena of special expertise, is the 
antithesis of a rule of law society. When generals impose martial law, that 
too is the antithesis of the rule of law. To insist that the president must take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed is to emphasize a fundamentally 
civilian duty. The Take Care Clause embeds the presidency in a civilian, 
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rule of law culture, not a military, efficacy-first culture. Even though the 
framers did not explicitly draft the Take Care Clause as a check on a 
president’s military ambitions, its emphasis on the primacy of civilian rule 
of law provides powerful evidence that the Constitution was not meant to 
establish a warrior-president. The underlying theories are simply too 
different. The consolidationist fuses civilian rule and military office; but 
the U.S. Constitution circumscribes the executive’s war powers and 
subordinates the executive to the law. It is separationist through and 
through. The idea that the commander in chief can override otherwise-valid 
laws seems very remote from the notion that the commander in chief office 
vests in a civilian president with a duty to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed. 
Of course, one might reply that in time of military crisis the president 
must be able to cut legal corners in order to preserve the nation, and that 
preserving the nation is itself necessary to faithfully execute its laws. That 
was the point of Lincoln’s famous rhetorical question in his 1861 war 
address: “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government 
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”223 (He was responding to the 
criticism “that one who is sworn to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,’ should not himself violate them.”224) In effect, Lincoln argued 
that the Take Care Clause required him to violate laws in order to save the 
republic, because with no republic no laws could be executed, faithfully or 
otherwise. 
In response, it may be conceded that in a dire emergency someone— 
of course, it need not be the president—might have to exercise extralegal 
emergency powers. But the imperative is a practical, not a legal, one. 
Lincoln’s twist on the argument for emergency powers is that they are not 
extralegal. But his somewhat dubious construction of the Take Care Clause 
makes sense only if the necessity is dire and the emergency powers are 
exceedingly short-term, as Lincoln’s were. Otherwise, it simply is not true 
that law violation is in the ultimate service of faithfully executing the laws. 
Long-term emergency powers do not execute laws—they supplant laws. As 
in a military dictatorship, exception becomes rule as faithful execution of 
the law gets deferred for years. Thus the proposition that the Take Care 
Clause licenses the long-term suspension of laws has no plausibility. 
But in any event, Lincoln’s argument has nothing to do with the 
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Commander in Chief Clause (and his war address never invokes it). On the 
one hand, not every military action involves an emergency; on the other, 
not every emergency requires a military response. So the idea that the Take 
Care Clause empowers the president to violate laws when acting as 
commander in chief has no plausible basis. 
E.  WHY THE PRESIDENT? 
So far, I have argued that all three of the major concerns of 
separationism—fear of military coups, the countervailing fear of civilian 
abuse of military power, and concern about adventurism—were active 
components of the constitutional debate, and that the result was a 
separationist constitution. This seems to neglect the other side of the 
debate: the arguments on behalf of a powerful executive, especially in 
wartime, and the undeniable fact that the Constitution does award the 
commander in chief power to the president. As I shall now suggest, 
however, even that decision had nothing to do with the consolidationist 
theory that the executive possesses military competence. 
This part of the story begins with the experience of the Revolution, 
when Congress was the civilian controller of the military.225 When 
Congress appointed Washington commander in chief of the Continental 
Army in June 1775, it instructed him “punctually to observe and follow 
such orders and directions, from time to time, as you shall receive from this 
or a future Congress . . . or a committee of Congress, for that purpose 
appointed.”226 Thus, the Continental Congress initially retained commander 
in chief power for itself, apparently out of concern that, left to his own 
devices, Washington could make himself a dictator.227 But this 
arrangement proved so incredibly inefficient that in December 1776, with 
the military effort on the verge of collapse, Congress turned operational 
command entirely over to Washington. Two weeks later, he crossed the 
Delaware and revived the revolutionaries’ fortunes with the victory at 
Princeton. In David Hackett Fischer’s words: 
Their grant of new powers to George Washington affirmed the rule of 
law, recognized the principle of civil supremacy over the military, and 
established the authority of Congress as representative of the states and 
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the sovereign people. At the same time, it also established another 
principle: the conduct of military operations by military officers, subject 
to the general oversight of Congress but without Congressional 
interference in operations. 
 This was an American compromise of some complexity. Other 
countries have gone a different way in the modern world. In many 
nations military officers took over the government by force of arms, and 
sometimes the army became the state. In Fascist and Communist 
regimes, civilian gauleiters and commissars controlled the military. The 
United States went a third way: civil control and military direction of its 
wars.228  
In making the president, rather than Congress, the civilian controller of the 
military, it is important to see that the constitutional framers were not 
objecting to this “third way.” They still wanted civilian control and military 
direction of wars. Their issue was that Congress would be too cumbersome 
a mechanism for even this kind of indirect control. It would frequently be 
out of session, sometimes for extended periods; its members could not 
assemble quickly; and, most importantly, the frictions and inefficiencies of 
debate would provide slow, uncertain guidance. Military command needs 
unity. 
At the constitutional convention, Pierce Butler warned about “the 
manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when 
threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing 
the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the 
Country . . . .”229 Two days later, Elbridge Gerry agreed that it would be a 
mistake to have “a general with three heads.”230 Notwithstanding these 
worries, Patterson’s New Jersey Plan favored a multiple executive, 
“provided that none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall 
on any occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct 
any enterprise as General, or in other capacity.”231 But the Convention 
dropped Patterson’s plan six weeks later, and adopted a single executive.232 
Its motion to do so did not specify who would receive the commander in 
chief power, but when the Committee on Detail returned a few days later 
with a draft, it assigned that power to the president.233 
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In The Federalist No. 70, Hamilton argued on behalf of a vigorous 
executive, including a denunciation of plural rule because “difference of 
opinion . . . might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the 
government in the most critical emergencies of the state.”234 His list of the 
four preconditions of an energetic executive places unity first, before 
duration, resources, and competent powers.235 Hamilton expanded the 
argument for unity of military command in The Federalist No. 74: 
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of 
power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the 
common strength; and the power of directing and employing the 
common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the 
executive authority.236  
In the North Carolina debate, James Iredell agreed: “From the nature of the 
thing, the command of armies ought to be delegated to one person only. 
The secrecy, despatch, and decision, which are necessary in military 
operations, can only be expected from one person.”237 This holds for a 
civilian commander in chief as well. In discussing the war powers, the 
framers understood that if the United States were suddenly attacked, the 
president would have to order troops to repel the attack without waiting for 
a Congressional declaration.238 
In The Federalist No. 70 Hamilton went further: arguing for a 
vigorous executive, he appealed by analogy to Roman history, where 
“often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a 
single man, under the formidable title of dictator.”239 But there is no 
evidence that other framers or ratifiers shared Hamilton’s apparent 
enthusiasm for an executive with dictatorial emergency powers; indeed, 
comments he made elsewhere suggest that Hamilton was not advocating 
dictatorship in emergencies, merely warning that weak government invites 
it.240 In the end none of the framers, including Hamilton, advocated 
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dictatorial powers for the executive, even in wartime. 
The fundamental point was that, given the need for civilian control of 
the military, the choice of making the president commander in chief 
prevailed because it was universally regarded as better than the alternatives 
of making Congress the commander in chief or having multiple 
commanders in chief. Although a substantial number of framers and 
ratifiers were alive to the dangers of a national government in command of 
an army, Congress was just as much part of the national government as the 
president; and the need for swift, unified military response to a sudden 
emergency dictated that the one-headed rather than many-headed branch of 
government should take control. None of these arguments amounts to 
repudiation of the need for civilian control of the military; in fact, none of 
them rules out concurrent authority by the other branches of government. 
And none of them rests on the consolidationist view that the president 
possesses military competence, or that civilian leadership entails military 
leadership. Assigning the commander in chief power to the president 
follows from the fact that the president is one and the legislators are many, 
not the fact that the president is the chief civilian executive. 
F.  SUMMARY OF THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
Let me summarize. I have tried to show that the framers and ratifiers 
of the Constitution were vividly aware of all the components of the 
separationist theory underlying civilian control of the military. Founding-
era polemics make that clear, but so does evidence from the Constitution 
itself, clearly manifesting the aim of constraining the executive’s power to 
use military force as he sees fit. To varying degrees, the framers and 
ratifiers feared a Caesar or a Cromwell, wished to limit the president’s 
power to abuse the standing army, despised military adventurism, and 
feared that a president with formidable war powers might indulge in it. 
Civilian control, not the desire to consolidate civil and military executive 
power, formed the background of the Commander in Chief Clause. The 
founding generation had no sympathy with the dying feudal ideology that 
ties civilian legitimacy to military ability. Although the framers and 
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ratifiers did not want to rule out the possibility that a militarily gifted 
president might take efficient command of troops, they had no expectation 
that this would happen. Instead, their expectation was (in David Hackett 
Fischer’s previously quoted words) the “third way” of civil control and 
military direction of the nation’s wars. The president (rather than Congress) 
received the commander in chief power solely out of the need for rapid, 
unified response in the face of a sudden invasion or similar military 
emergency, coupled with the background demand that supreme military 
command lie in the hands of civilians. And even in wartime, the 
presidential commander in chief remains under the obligation to execute 
the laws faithfully. 
IV.  THE MODERN THEORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 
A.  THEN AND NOW 
We have seen that the theory underlying the Commander in Chief 
Clause was separationist, not consolidationist, and it contemplated a 
civilian commander in chief whose military competence could be near zero 
and whose exercise of the command function would be circumscribed by 
hiving off crucial military powers and giving them to Congress or the 
states. Although case law on the Commander in Chief Clause is sparse, 
such early nineteenth-century cases as Little v. Barreme (which upheld civil 
liability against a naval officer for taking action that Congress had 
prohibited, even though President Adams had ordered it) and Fleming v. 
Page (which held that the president’s commander in chief authority is 
narrowly military) confirmed that understanding.241 
But the world has changed, and many of the debates that preoccupied 
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution are little more than historical 
curiosities today. Nobody in the United States fears a military coup, or ever 
has since the Constitution went into effect. The standing army debate has 
vanished to the point that few contemporary Americans would even 
recognize the phrase “standing army.” The Third Amendment is nothing 
more than a constitutional curiosity, never once litigated in the Supreme 
Court. As for the Second Amendment, it has come increasingly to stand for 
individual gun rights having nothing to do with militias; and those today 
who insist that the Second Amendment has to do primarily with militias are 
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advocates of gun control, not militias. 
For that matter, the militias of yesteryear—retitled the National Guard 
in 1933242—bear no resemblance to the primary defensive force that the 
framers and ratifiers envisioned. The last serious use the antebellum 
national government made of state militias was the Seminole War of 1836 
to 1842, and by 1860 the militia system had effectively collapsed.243 State 
militias revived in the 1870s, but that is largely because they proved useful 
in violently repressing the labor movement—a rather bitter irony given the 
founding era’s image of the militias as defenders of the people’s liberty.244 
We should likewise not forget that the Anti-Federalists came out on 
the wrong side of history. They favored an agrarian America, feared the 
dominance of urban financiers, and doubted the very possibility of large 
republics. Although some Anti-Federalists were protolibertarians whose 
mantle contemporary libertarians claim, they were generally no friends of 
the capitalist enterprise dear to the hearts of today’s libertarians. The Anti-
Federalists were often Southern sectionalists, isolationists, and 
antimodernists.245 Like it or not, we are Hamilton’s heirs, not George 
Mason’s or Patrick Henry’s. Phrases like “militiamen” and “posse 
comitatus,” which represented objects of serious debate during the framing 
and ratification, today belong to lunatics stockpiling ammo in case the 
government sends the black helicopters after them. 
B.  THE PERSISTENCE OF SEPARATIONIST CONCERNS 
But not all the preoccupations of the founding and ratifying debates 
are obsolete. Concerns about military interference with politics, 
presidential abuse of the commander in chief power, and military 
adventurism remain alive and well. They take a less dramatic form than the 
founding generation’s worries about armed seizures of power, but even the 
less extreme forms show that the fundamental political forces that the 
founding generation debated still exist and still need to be held in check. 
The “third way” is, in effect, a moral compact between civilian and 
military leaders. As it has evolved over two centuries, its basic clauses are 
easy to describe. On the military side, the obligation is to cede overall 
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control (that is, political decisionmaking) to civilian leaders; more 
generally, to abstain from politics. It is also to offer objective and 
independent military advice to civilian leaders. Last but obviously not least, 
it is to obey lawful orders, even very foolish ones issued in blatant 
disregard of military advice. On the civilian side, the first obligation is to 
listen hard to military advice and take it seriously, even if it is politically 
unwelcome; the second obligation is to use the military prudently and 
reluctantly, knowing that every war comes with a butcher’s bill attached; 
and third is to respect the political neutrality of the military, not using it to 
advance domestic partisan ends. 
On the military side, the classic form of defection from the moral 
compact occurs when military leaders meddle in politics. An obvious 
contemporary concern is military intervention in party politics.246 A recent 
case in point concerns Army General David Petraeus’s September 2004 
Op-Ed in the Washington Post, which presented an upbeat picture of Iraqi 
security forces, less than six weeks before a national election in which Iraq 
progress was a crucial issue.247 Petraeus had recently taken over the 
training of Iraqi forces, and observers gave him high grades.248 
Nevertheless, the Op-Ed was an unusual intervention. As one commentator 
wrote, “If Petraeus wrote on his own initiative, he was injecting himself 
improperly into a political campaign. If he was encouraged or even allowed 
to do this by his civilian superiors, he was allowing himself to be used for 
partisan political purposes.”249 
A more common problem arises when military leaders resist policy 
choices by civilian leadership. This has happened many times. To varying 
degrees, the military initially resisted racial integration, women in the 
military, and, more recently, President Clinton’s attempt to permit gays to 
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serve openly.250 Of course, these were policy choices about the military 
itself; they are not troubling in the same way that military interference with 
civilian affairs would be. Only the latter would be analogous to the 
founding generation’s worries about a Caesar or a Cromwell. 
More troubling was the role played by Colin Powell during the George 
H. W. Bush administration, when Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (“JCS”). During the Balkan Wars, Powell gave an on-the-record 
interview to the New York Times arguing against the use of U.S. military 
force in Bosnia—an interview that arguably tied the administration’s hands 
at a time when it had not yet decided what to do about Bosnia.251 
Perhaps the most significant example of a military initiative to 
constrain civilian political choices was General Creighton Abrams’s post-
Vietnam force reorganization. Abrams assigned key combat support roles 
to the reserves, a move designed to ensure that U.S. forces could no longer 
be used without mobilizing the reserves.252 The idea was to force civilian 
leaders to burn political capital and garner popular support if they wanted a 
war; as Abrams said, “They’re never going to take us to war again without 
calling up the reserves.”253 In an interview, a four-star general remarked 
that Abrams devised the strategy “with malice aforethought” to tie civilian 
hands and prevent another Vietnam.254 Now, Abrams’s strategy may well 
have been a prudent one: in the aftermath of Vietnam, military morale was 
at its absolute nadir, and Abrams wanted to buy the Army a respite to 
reconstruct and rebuild itself. He also shared the widely held diagnosis that 
the erosion of popular support within the United States ultimately caused 
the defeat in Vietnam. Prudent or not, however, Abrams’s scheme 
represents a military-imposed constraint on the civilian leadership’s foreign 
policy options. 
Obviously, none of these examples rises to the level of a mutiny or a 
coup; but, by resisting political choices that lie within the authority of 
elected leaders, all of them violate the moral compact built into civilian 
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control of the military (sometimes in response to the military’s perception 
that civilian leaders have violated the moral compact by making feckless 
political choices that degrade military effectiveness). They demonstrate that 
even if the eighteenth-century fear of coups has little contemporary 
relevance, a scaled-down fear of military interference with politics remains 
relevant. (In actual combat situations, it should be noted, the military 
hardly ever thwarts civilian plans by refusing to accept them: Feaver’s 
careful coding of twenty-seven key post-1945 incidents finds only four in 
which the military “shirked.”255) 
What about the second concern of the framers and ratifiers, about the 
potential that a president might abuse the command of a standing army to 
expand and consolidate his power? Clearly, under currently imaginable 
circumstances the worry about a presidential coup is just as farfetched as 
worry about a Praetorian mutiny—the government is not sending in the 
black helicopters. But the generalized concern about presidents 
aggrandizing executive power is entirely real, as is the more specific 
concern about presidents aggrandizing power by asserting their commander 
in chief authority. 
The generalized concern is hardly new: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
wrote The Imperial Presidency in 1973, and he dates imperial 
presidentialism back to the Truman Administration.256 Most if not all 
administrations since then have made muscular assertions of executive 
power.257 The Bush Administration’s assertions of executive power have 
been remarkable and far-reaching. They are grounded in the “unitary 
executive” theory fueled by the perception by the president and vice 
president that presidential power had dangerously eroded after Vietnam. 
These assertions include the commander in chief override argument, 
freewheeling use of signing statements to spin legislation in a direction 
favorable to executive power, greatly enhanced secrecy of executive branch 
processes, intensely partisan efforts to maintain discipline within the 
executive branch, and aggressive maneuvers to keep the review of 
executive decisions out of the courts.258 
The more specific concern about presidents enhancing their power by 
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asserting the commander in chief authority obviously dates back at least to 
Youngstown in the Truman administration, if not earlier.259 But the Bush 
administration’s assertions of commander in chief authority have been 
particularly far-reaching. For example, President Bush’s signing statement 
regarding the Detainee Treatment Act, which prohibits cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment short of torture, asserted that he would implement the 
prohibition “in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief and to supervise the unitary executive 
branch.”260 This statement, vague though it is, would be empty unless the 
president meant that his commander in chief authority permits him to order 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees. In the same 
legislation, Congress amended statutes to ensure that JAGs give 
independent legal advice, in response to the back-to-back scandals of Abu 
Ghraib and the release of torture-permissive legal opinions; here, President 
Bush’s signing statement asserted that “[t]he executive branch shall 
construe [the amendments] in a manner consistent with: (1) the President’s 
constitutional authorities to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to 
supervise the unitary executive branch, and as Commander in 
Chief . . . .”261 
The JAG signing statement is particularly significant. Vice President 
Cheney’s hostility to the independence of the JAG Corps dates back to his 
tenure as Secretary of Defense in the early 1990s, and has continued 
unabated throughout the second Bush Administration.262 On one 
interpretation, the attempt to subordinate the JAGs’ independence might be 
regarded as a salutary effort to maintain civilian control over the 
military.263 But according to the “third way,” the moral compact between 
the civilian leadership and the uniformed military holds that, while the 
military does not interfere in politics, the civilian leadership takes 
independent military advice seriously. When the military are JAG lawyers, 
that means permitting them to offer independent legal advice—which is, in 
fact, an ethical requirement for all lawyers, including military lawyers.264 
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Attempting to subordinate the JAGs to civilian lawyers in the Defense 
Department—political appointees—violates that moral compact.265 
Finally, the experiences of Vietnam and Iraq—and some would add 
Kosovo—raise the specter of military adventurism.266 Neither represented 
adventurism in the classic sense of rulers launching wars for purposes of 
self-aggrandizement or personal glory. Rather, what makes both these wars 
adventuristic is that the presidents decided almost unilaterally to launch or 
escalate them, insulating themselves in the process from military advice. In 
the Bush administration, the momentous decision to go to war was made by 
a tiny, secretive circle of high-level officials—as mentioned earlier, 
Woodward asserts that the president consulted only two advisors267—and 
Thomas Ricks quotes a four-star general about how they ducked military 
advice: 
There was a conscious cutting off of advice and concerns, so that the guy 
who ultimately had to make the decision, the president, didn’t get the 
advice. Well before the troops crossed the line of departure . . . concern 
was raised about what would happen in the postwar period, how you 
would deal with this decapitated country. It was blown off.268  
Descriptions of the almost solipsistic Iraq decisionmaking in the Bush 
White House eerily echo H. R. McMasters’s stunning and influential 
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history of decisionmaking in the early stages of Vietnam escalation.269 John 
F. Kennedy, he reports, cut the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs 
out of the advising loop, preferring to confer only with his “inner club.”270 
Kennedy blamed the Bay of Pigs fiasco on bad advice from the Joint 
Chiefs;271 and, after their advice on the Cuban missile crisis proved inferior 
to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s strategy, McNamara 
increasingly came to believe that he and his systems analysts could plan a 
war better than the military.272 Interservice squabbles among the Chiefs 
undercut their effectiveness as advisors during both the Kennedy and 
Johnson years, making it easier for the defense secretary to arrogate 
decisionmaking to himself.273 Johnson, inheriting Kennedy’s advisors, 
confined his Vietnam decisionmaking to a small circle of civilians—
McNamara, John McNaughton, the Bundy brothers—with only retired 
General Maxwell Taylor to provide a military perspective. The highly 
political Taylor was at odds with the JCS, and occasionally lied when 
communicating their advice to the president; Johnson, in turn, lied to the 
Chiefs and manipulated them.274 In September 1964 the JCS war-gamed 
the escalating Vietnam conflict, and the result foretold with astounding 
accuracy virtually the entire future of the war, including that “escalation of 
American military involvement would erode public support for the war in 
the United States” and allow North Vietnam to outlast the Americans.275 
The game’s conclusions, however, “were never seriously studied and had 
no discernible impact on American policy.”276 The two most costly and 
divisive warmaking decisions of the past half-century, Vietnam and Iraq, 
were a direct result of presidents who violated the moral compact 
represented by the “third way.” 
In short, none of the founding generation’s concerns about military 
insubordination, presidential power aggrandizement, and military 
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adventurism are dead, even if they do not take the extreme forms that the 
Anti-Federalists feared. In Faulkner’s phrase, the past is not dead—it is not 
even past.277 
C.  THE “THIRD WAY” TODAY 
Seeing that the founders’ and ratifiers’ concerns still exist today does 
not answer the question of whether separationism remains the best response 
to them. To determine whether the separationist conception of the 
commander in chief makes continued sense today, we will need to fast-
forward to contemporary conceptions of civilian-military relations. The 
background question I shall use to organize discussion is whether Fischer’s 
“third way”—civil control and military direction, avoiding both the 
politicization of the military and the militarization of civilian life—remains 
as valid now as it did when the Continental Congress abandoned its effort 
to micromanage General Washington. For, if so, then the unwritten 
understanding that the Commander in Chief Clause is not meant to create a 
consolidationist warrior-executive with expansive war powers remains 
valid as well. 
Answering this question will require some delving into contemporary 
debates about civilian-military relations. But, as a first approximation, it 
seems clear that the argument for the “third way” is, if anything, stronger 
today than at the time of the framing. 
For one thing, military command is a far more technical and 
specialized subject today than two centuries ago. Lincoln personally tested 
firearms during the Civil War, after which he pressed the Army’s head 
ordnance officer to mass produce breech-loading rifles.278 The idea of a 
twenty-first-century president personally evaluating hi-tech weapons 
systems is absurd. 
Furthermore, a modern president’s domestic-policy responsibilities 
exceed anything that an eighteenth- or nineteenth-century predecessor 
could have imagined. Along with these responsibilities go overwhelming 
political demands on modern presidents in an era of photo-ops and nonstop 
electioneering and fund-raising. Together, the modern president’s other 
responsibilities make the idea of direct presidential military supervision 
unthinkable on anything other than a very occasional basis. Presidents 
simply have too much else to do. Adam Smith, we recall, argued that the 
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division of labor requires a professional military.279 That division of labor 
has proceeded far beyond Smith’s wildest dreams. Civil-military 
consolidationism today is impossible. 
A contemporary example will illustrate the problem. In 2004, Robert 
D. Blackwill was the coordinator for strategic planning for Iraq in the 
National Security Council.280 He traveled with President Bush throughout 
the last two months of the 2004 election campaign. 
Blackwill was struck that there was never any real time to discuss 
policy. . . . As the NSC coordinator for Iraq, Blackwill probably knew as 
much about the war as anybody in the White House. He had spent 
months in Iraq with Bremer. But he was with the campaign only as part 
of the politics of reelection. Not once did Bush ask Blackwill what things 
were like in Iraq, what he had seen, or what should be done. Blackwill 
was astonished at the round-the-clock, all-consuming focus on winning 
the election. Nothing else came close.281  
The obvious response by defenders of executive preeminence in 
military matters is one that I briefly considered earlier: that “the president” 
is really shorthand for “the executive branch that the president heads.” The 
real issue is executive branch leadership of war efforts, not individual 
presidential leadership. At the president’s disposal are a National Security 
Council, a Defense Department, and hundreds of militarily sophisticated 
civilian staff (including former military officers and life-long students of 
national security). These, not the president personally, exercise the 
commander in chief’s day-to-day operational functions. On important 
issues the president remains, in George W. Bush’s famous word, the 
ultimate “decider”; but most of the commander in chief power gets 
exercised by proxy. 
However, this response undercuts the familiar Hamiltonian arguments 
for executive preeminence. For Hamilton, remember, the essential contrast 
is between the deliberative, slow-moving, friction-ridden, many-headed 
legislature and the energetic, expeditious, resourceful executive. Hamilton 
considers unity the first precondition for an energetic executive, and unity 
means, quite literally, the unity of a single will. Hamilton’s argument for 
executive preeminence collapses if plurality replaces unity because dozens 
or hundreds of people are actually discharging the president’s powers of 
war and peace. Under such circumstances we find interagency and 
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interservice competition in place of unity, and grinding bureaucratic 
friction in place of dispatch. 
The Iraq war offers illuminating examples. In 2005, Donald Rumsfeld 
explained to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley that the inability of 
the U.S. government to accomplish even elementary tasks in the Iraq war 
resulted because “the interagency process was broken.”282 In saying this, he 
was echoing Condoleezza Rice, who two years earlier complained to 
Blackwill about “the dysfunctional U.S. government”283—except that she 
believed that Rumsfeld was part of the dysfunction.  
[Blackwill] soon understood what she meant. He attended the deputies 
committee meetings where Armitage and Doug Feith often sat across 
from each other in the Situation Room. The hostility between them was 
enormous . . . . 
 The principals meetings or NSC meetings with Powell and 
Rumsfeld . . . had the same surreal quality, rarely airing the real 
issues. . . . Rumsfeld made his presentation looking at the president, 
while Powell looked straight ahead. Then Powell would make his to the 
president with Rumsfeld looking straight ahead. They didn’t even 
comment on each other’s statements or views. So Bush never had the 
benefit of a serious, substantive discussion between his principal 
advisers. And the president, whose legs often jiggled under the table, did 
not force a discussion. 
 Blackwill saw Rice try to intervene and get nowhere. So critical 
comments and questions—especially about military strategy—never 
surfaced. . . . The image locked in Blackwill’s mind of Rice, dutiful, 
informed and polite, at one end of the table, and the inexperienced 
president at the other, legs dancing, while the bulls [Cheney, Powell, and 
Rumsfeld] staked out their ground, almost snorting defiantly, hoofs 
pawing the table, daring a challenge that never came.284  
Of course, as an alternative to the sclerotic bureaucracy, the president 
can choose to confine decisionmaking to himself and his closest advisors, 
as in the initial decision to invade Iraq. The result was a process in which 
expert advice was frequently ignored; and as a direct consequence, the Iraq 
war proceeded without a cogent postinvasion plan.285 That is the dilemma: 
 
 282. Id. at 379–80. 
 283. Id. at 241. 
 284. Id. at 241–42. 
 285. CHANDRASEKARAN, supra note 16, at 28–37; RICKS, supra note 248 at 96–111; 
WOODWARD, supra note 30, at 316–17. Specifically, there was no plan (and not enough troops) to 
provide immediate security and prevent looting; no plan to secure caches of conventional weapons that 
Saddam Hussein had distributed throughout Iraq and which helped arm the insurgency; no plan to 
  
2008] COMMANDER IN CHIEF POWER 543 
 
Hamiltonian unity comes from centralized decisionmaking, but competence 
comes from division of labor among many hands. You cannot have it both 
ways. If the president is going to proxy the commander in chief power 
through a civilian bureaucracy, the argument for war powers concentrated 
in the executive, based as it is on Hamilton’s contrast between unity and 
multiplicity, fails. If, on the other hand, the president centralizes 
decisionmaking to herself and a handful of advisors, to approximate the 
unity of will Hamilton had in mind, then the complexity of the job under 
modern conditions makes it nearly impossible to carry out. Given this 
dilemma, it surely seems more plausible to maintain the “third way” of 
civilian control and military direction. 
To say that the executive branch (in distinction from the president) 
lacks the unity of will Hamilton’s institutional competence argument 
requires is obviously not to say that some other branch of government is 
superior to the executive in that respect. Rather, it is to say that the 
institutional competence argument for exclusive executive-branch 
prerogatives in matters of war and peace cannot be sustained. The operative 
word here is “exclusive”: the commander in chief override, like the 
argument for great judicial deference to the executive in military matters, 
looks weaker and less appealing once we realize that “the executive” is 
either a single-willed but amateur decisionmaker, or a bureaucracy whose 
failures of competence are often as conspicuous as its successes. Based on 
institutional competence, the argument for overlapping or concurrent 
powers appears a lot more appealing. In the legislative context, this means 
a substantial claim for Congressional war powers; in the judicial context, it 
means less deference to executive branch assertions grounded in the 
commander in chief’s illusory military expertise—particularly when those 
assertions involve subjects far removed from the narrow power of military 
command. 
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This last point is important. Some might object to my line of argument 
that the central issue is not competence in absolute terms, but relative 
competence—and the executive branch certainly enjoys an advantage over 
Congress and the courts when it comes to military decisions. However, this 
argument begs the question in two respects. First, it begs the question to 
label a decision like whether to torture captives, or whether to classify them 
as enemy combatants, a military decision. Congress can and has 
criminalized torture, and there is no reason to doubt that deciding which 
forms of violence should be prohibited by a criminal law ordinarily falls 
within the competence of legislatures. Similarly, as Judge Mukasey argued 
in Padilla, determining on the basis of evidence whether a legal concept 
applies in a particular case falls under the competence of judges.286 In 
matters far removed from battlefield activities, we actually have no reason 
to suppose that the executive is the most competent organ of government 
even on relative terms. Second, the objection begs the question by 
presupposing that whichever branch of government is relatively more 
competent should have preclusive authority, that is, authority that excludes 
the other branches. There is no reason to assume that that leads to better 
decisionmaking.  
D.  HUNTINGTON AND OBJECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL 
To develop the argument for the “third way,” it will be useful to 
examine some contemporary theories of civilian-military relations. The 
modern study of civilian-military relations began in 1957, with Samuel 
Huntington’s dazzling early book The Soldier and the State, which remains 
the dominant work even half a century later. As we shall see, Huntington 
arrives, through a very different argument, at largely the same result as the 
framers and ratifiers: endorsement of the American “third way,” which 
insists on a division of labor in which civilian leaders set political aims and 
superintend the military, but without pretending military competence or 
assuming battlefield responsibilities. 
This convergence is surprising, because Huntington’s fundamental 
outlook is deeply antithetical to the separationist argument for civilian 
control of the military. Huntington disapproves of the scheme of war 
powers in the U.S. Constitution, which in his view “does not permit the 
objective civilian control compatible with a high level of military 
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professionalism.”287 Although he concedes that the separation of powers 
exemplifies “the basic genius of American government” and “prevents the 
arbitrary and dictatorial use of power,”288 Huntington finds it frustratingly 
inefficient in military matters, and argues that it invites a dangerous 
blurring of political and military functions.289 
Moreover, Huntington is an unabashed militarist, who concludes his 
book with the admonition that “today America can learn more from West 
Point than West Point from America.”290 His political views combine frank 
and explicit hatred of liberalism, dislike for business conservatives because 
of their pacifist tendencies, and an utter contempt for ordinary American 
life in its “tiresome monotony” and “garish individualism.”291 For 
Huntington, civilian America is Babylon, and he admires the professional 
military because it represents “a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon.”292 
His book culminates in a hymn to the “ordered serenity” of West Point, 
where “[b]eauty and utility are merged in gray stone,” and where “[i]n 
order is found peace; in discipline, fulfillment; in community, security.”293 
Huntington’s preference for clean, centralized Spartan hierarchy over 
concurrent, separated powers mirrors his distaste for “the incredible variety 
and discordancy” of “the American spirit at its most commonplace.”294 He 
sometimes seems frustrated that it is America and not Sparta that he lives in 
and whose army he is discussing. 
Fortunately, Huntington’s disdain for America’s fractious political 
life, and his doubts about its constitution, can be detached from the core 
insights of The Soldier and the State. Huntington’s great achievement was 
to reformulate the argument for civilian control in terms suitable for a 
contemporary professional military rather than an eighteenth-century army 
of farmers. Huntington announces the decisive break from eighteenth-
century concerns in his early pages: “The activities of the Praetorian Guard 
offer few useful lessons for civilian control: the problem in the modern 
state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician.”295 
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To begin with, we should notice that there has never been a danger of 
military coup in U.S. history. Though it would be nice to credit this to the 
wisdom of the constitutional design, a constitution alone cannot make 
coups unthinkable. If they have been unthinkable in America, it is because 
America has been spared the social and political preconditions of military 
seizures of power: in the words of a contemporary student of civil-military 
relations, these are “catastrophic defeat in battle, collapse of the civilian 
political order, persistent underfunding of the military coupled with 
cronyism and corruption in the military personnel system.”296 
Without the danger of coups, perhaps the rest of the eighteenth-
century argument for civilian control of the military is equally irrelevant to 
the modern state. That, I will suggest shortly, is wrong. But the wide 
disparity between the framers’ and ratifiers’ understanding and 
contemporary reality sets the stage for Huntington’s argument. In his view, 
the original understanding of civilian-military relations is an inadequate 
guide to the modern problem of civilian control—the relation of the expert 
to the politician—because the constitutional framers simply did not 
envision a modern professionalized military.297 That, according to 
Huntington, first came into being two decades later when Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau modernized the Prussian military, and set the standard that all 
other modern militaries soon emulated.298 
The emergence of military professionalism had two preconditions. 
First was the notion that there is indeed such a thing as “military science,” a 
stable set of principles that can be studied and taught in a systematic way. 
That idea grew out of the carefully calculated maneuver warfare of the late 
eighteenth century, viewed through the lens of Enlightenment 
rationalism.299 Clausewitz’s On War, published posthumously in 1832, is 
the most famous effort to set out the principles of warfare systematically;300 
but an earlier benchmark is the establishment of national military 
academies. West Point, Saint-Cyr, and the Royal Military College all came 
into being in 1802, and Scharnhorst set up the Prussian Kriegsakademie (of 
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which Clausewitz was a product) eight years later. The academies 
combined military science with a broad general education and strict 
discipline; the United States, with its technological bent, also incorporated 
a foundation in engineering.301 
Complementing the creation of military science was the establishment 
of meritocracy in the officer corps. In European practice, this meant 
abolishing the two prevailing methods for choosing officers, aristocratic 
birth and the purchase of commissions by wealthy families to provide 
careers for their sons.302 Together, the establishment of an expert discipline 
and the merit-based recruitment of its practitioners created the professional 
military. 
The upshot was the all-important link between expertise and 
professionalism in the officer corps, and this is the heart of Huntington’s 
argument. Expertise alone is not enough. Military expertise, like expertise 
in other life-and-death matters, needs to be combined with professional 
ethics: a sense of responsibility beyond self-interest, and, in Huntington’s 
words, “a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a 
group apart from laymen.”303 Huntington thus defines professionalism as 
the union of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. No doubt 
professional attitudes (in this sense) are desirable in all ranks of a military 
organization, but they are indispensable in the officer corps. The 
fundamental question is how professionalism can be maintained in an 
organization directed by political officials responsive to electoral opinion. 
A key step in professionalizing the military lay in Clausewitz’s idea 
that military force is an instrument for rationally pursuing the state’s 
political ends, not an instrument of glory-seeking.304 At the same time that 
he rationalized strategy and tactics, Clausewitz turned the military into (in 
Huntington’s words) “the tool of the state.”305 In Huntington’s version of 
the relationship, the civilian government sets the political ends for which 
military power is used, the military provides the technical means, and 
neither meddles in the other’s appointed sphere. 
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It follows that professional military officers must be apolitical as a 
matter of principle: their job is not to set the state’s goals or to govern, but 
rather to execute political decisions reached by the civilian government 
regardless of their personal convictions. On this issue Huntington is 
uncompromising. In a remarkably chilly passage, he goes so far as to 
criticize the German officers who joined the anti-Hitler resistance: they 
“forgot that it is not the function of military officers to decide questions of 
war and peace.”306 Where most of the world regards Stauffenberg and his 
colleagues as martyrs who died gruesome deaths trying to rid the world of a 
monster, Huntington sees a lapse from military professionalism. 
This vision of professionalism as a morally nonjudgmental, zealous 
pursuit of a client’s ends is closer to that of lawyers, at least on one 
standard view of legal ethics, than that of physicians. Physicians have one 
overarching professional goal, healing the sick; they are not tools of their 
patients in any other respect. But the lawyer is the client’s agent; and in 
contemporary legal ethics, clients set the ends of representation while 
lawyers hold sway over the means.307 That is exactly the relationship 
Huntington has in mind when he speaks of military responsibility. For him, 
civilian control of the military is inherent in the very ideals of military 
professionalism. Rather than deriving civilian control from the need to 
solve the Gilgamesh problem or the imperatives of democratic theory, 
Huntington derives it directly from the concept of professionalism.308 
But how is civilian control to be achieved? One time-honored idea is a 
kind of emotional and moral sympathy between the military and its people. 
This was the solution of the Gilgamesh poet and Plato. It was also 
Blackstone’s idea: “[I]t is requisite that the armies . . . should . . . have the 
same spirit with the people . . . . Nothing then, according to these 
principles, ought to be more guarded against in a free state, than making the 
military power . . . a body too distinct from the people.”309 Hamilton 
offered a related argument in The Federalist No. 29.310 Huntington labels 
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this approach “subjective civilian control,” which “achieves its end by 
civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state.”311 
And he rejects it utterly. Military officers practice a singular 
profession, the management of violence, and their attitudes are necessarily 
remote from those of civilians. The very fact that they are sworn to 
sacrifice their own lives if necessary, even for policies that they may find 
politically objectionable or downright stupid, already guarantees that 
officers are not mirrors of the liberal state. Deadly self-sacrifice for goals 
not one’s own is the antithesis of liberal-individualist ideas about the 
importance of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
By emphasizing the civilian-military difference, Huntington 
emphatically does not mean that civilians are peace-loving and the military 
are latter-day Alexanders. Quite the contrary. One of his key insights is that 
the modern military professional has attitudes far removed from the glory-
seeking adventurers of the Iliad. Professional military officers are security-
conscious rather than glory-conscious, and that often makes them more 
antiwar than many civilians: 
The military man normally opposes reckless, aggressive, belligerent 
action. . . . War at any time is an intensification of the threats to the 
military security of the state, and generally war should not be resorted to 
except as a final recourse, and only when the outcome is a virtual 
certainty. . . . Thus, the military man rarely favors war. . . . Accordingly, 
the professional military man contributes a cautious, conservative, 
restraining voice to the formulation of state policy. This has been his 
typical role in most modern states including fascist Germany, communist 
Russia, and democratic America. He is afraid of war. He wants to 
prepare for war. But he is never ready to fight a war.312  
Civilians may be adventurist. Military professionals are not. This has 
certainly been the prevailing stance of the post-Vietnam U.S. military. 
Colin Powell, we should remember, was skeptical of both the Persian Gulf 
War and the Kosovo War.313 Jarring as it may sound, Huntington labels the 
military ethic as pacifist.314 
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If not subjective civilian control, then what? Huntington’s main idea is 
this: 
Civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military 
professionalism. More precisely, it is that distribution of political power 
between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the 
emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of 
the officer corps. Objective civilian control is thus directly opposed to 
subjective civilian control. Subjective civilian control achieves its end by 
civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective 
civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making 
them the tool of the state.315  
For Huntington, a properly professionalized military is, by definition, under 
strict civilian control, and therefore the Anti-Federalist fear of standing 
armies, along with the constitutional protections against their supposed 
dangers, becomes almost laughably irrelevant to the modern state. 
To achieve objective civilian control, Huntington advocates what he 
calls a “balanced pattern” between the president, the secretary of defense, 
and the military leadership. It establishes a line of authority from the 
president to the defense secretary to the chief military commanders and 
advisors, in which “[t]he military chief is subordinate to the secretary who 
is subordinate to the President, but neither of the two civilian officials 
exercise military command. Military command stops at the level of the 
military chief.”316 
For our purposes, the crucial consequence of Huntington’s linkage 
between military professionalism, objective civilian control, and the 
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balanced pattern is this: even after replacing the eighteenth-century theory 
of civil-military relations, Huntington nevertheless retains the fundamental 
“third way” compromise: civilian control, military direction. 
The reason should be obvious. The professional military has its own 
unique expertise, and it would be dangerous for the amateur president or 
defense secretary to ignore expert advice, and catastrophic if they go 
further and start to play general. Conversely, only the civilian officials set 
the ends of state policy. Huntington’s vision of military professionalism 
requires a depoliticized military that is, in words quoted earlier, a tool of 
the state. The separation of statesmanship and strategy would be menaced 
“by the tendency of politicians to invade the independent realm of the 
military.”317 
Of course the president retains the constitutional authority to play 
general if he wants; that much, at least, is clear from the spare text of the 
Commander in Chief Clause. Huntington therefore calls the imperative 
toward objective civilian control “extraconstitutional, a part of our political 
tradition but not of our constitutional tradition. Civilian control has, in a 
sense, been like the party system. . . . Neither is contemplated in the 
Constitution, yet both have been called into existence by nonconstitutional 
forces.”318 
This, I believe, is on the right track but not precisely right. Huntington 
is correct that objective civilian control—the admonition for the president 
not to invade the independent realm of the military—does not appear in the 
text of the Commander in Chief Clause, which says nothing about the 
civilian commander’s responsibilities. But that does not make it 
extraconstitutional. When a written text underspecifies its concepts, 
unwritten background understandings must supply the meaning. 
Originalists and nonoriginalists agree about this; where they disagree is 
about whether the relevant background understandings are those at the time 
of the framing or those of today. And, if the background understandings at 
the time of the framing and now are the same, originalists and their 
adversaries can agree that it defines constitutional meaning. 
That is the situation with the commander in chief power. At the time 
of the framing and ratification, the background understanding was the 
“third way” of civilian control coupled with military direction, growing out 
of separationist premises grounded in fear of military seizures of power. 
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Under Huntington’s account, the background understanding remains the 
“third way,” although it grows out of the requirements of professionalism, 
not out of the fear of coups and adventurism. 
Huntington’s point that objective civilian control is deeply embedded 
in our political tradition thus provides the interpretive key to the 
Commander in Chief Clause. According to that tradition, the civilian 
commander in chief has never been a consolidationist warrior-king. 
Earlier, I argued that the unwritten understanding implies that the 
commander in chief authority consists of the narrow power of military 
command, rather than standing for a broad, uncircumscribed battery of 
“presidential war powers” over which the commander in chief holds 
exclusive sway. As we saw, given eighteenth-century concerns about 
military mutiny, presidential abuse of the standing army, and adventurism, 
it is vanishingly unlikely that the framers’ constitution created a broad 
rather than a narrow commander in chief authority. A broad authority 
would be appropriate for a consolidationist warrior-executive, but the 
framers and ratifiers were separationists, not consolidationists. 
Huntington’s argument against the warrior-executive is simply that 
amateurs should not usurp control from professionals. Civilian leaders are 
supposed to make political choices, not military choices, and blurring the 
line undermines military professionalism. Huntington’s is a division of 
labor (or, as he says, “separation of functions”) argument rather than a 
separation of powers argument.319 On either theory, the idea that the 
commander in chief power contains war powers beyond commanding the 
military makes little sense. Indeed, Huntington notices that the principal 
use of the Commander in Chief Clause “has been to expand presidential 
power against Congress in nonmilitary areas.”320 This, he argues, became a 
constitutional possibility because the Commander in Chief Clause names 
an office without specifying its functions; this “has been of great use to the 
President in expanding his power” but has “indirectly . . . impeded civilian 
control by increasing the likelihood that military leaders will be drawn 
into . . . political controversy.”321 
To summarize, Huntington offers five fundamental insights: (1) the 
reformulation of the problem of civilian control as the relation between the 
expert and the politician; (2) the insistence that military professionalism is 
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essential to a proper relation between the expert and the politician; (3) the 
concept of objective civilian control, that is, the definition of civilian 
control as an institutional arrangement that maximizes military 
professionalism; (4) the proposition that objective civilian control requires 
a balanced pattern consisting of civilian determination of political ends and 
military direction of the means for attaining them; and (5) the 
understanding that all of these propositions are deeply embedded in our 
political tradition, forming our unwritten understanding of what a civilian 
commander in chief does. 
All of these insights have great plausibility—and, taken together, they 
lead to the same conclusion as the eighteenth-century argument for civilian 
control of the military. Huntington also believes that the eighteenth-century 
theory is irrelevant today. But that conclusion is not crucial to the rest of 
the theory. There is no necessary inconsistency between eighteenth-century 
separationism, with its focus on the Gilgamesh problem and fear of 
government abuse of military power, and Huntington’s emphasis on 
military professionalism. Both, in any case, reject the consolidationist 
conception of the warrior-executive, and both therefore support a narrow 
reading of the Commander in Chief Clause. 
E.  POLITICAL AND MILITARY DECISIONS 
If civilian leaders are supposed to make political choices but not 
military ones, why should the president hold even the narrow power of 
military command? Why should the president’s role as commander in chief 
remain an efficient rather than a merely dignified role? 
The basic answer to the question of why the president must retain the 
power of command is that military decisions can have political 
implications, and civilian dominion over political decisionmaking requires 
the authority to subordinate military considerations to political ones. 
Huntington acknowledges this point.322 But it plays a small part in his 
argument, no doubt because it fuzzies up the sharp distinction he draws 
between (political) ends, set by civilian leaders, and (military) means, 
which are left to the generals. In an important and spirited critique of 
Huntington, Eliot Cohen emphasizes that even minor-looking tactical 
choices often have political implications, and that civilian leaders properly 
intervene when that is the case.323 This point seems correct, even on 
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Huntington’s premises. Unlike Cohen, however, I regard it as a friendly 
amendment to Huntington’s theory rather than an important objection to it. 
Some examples will illustrate the point that military decisions can 
have political implications. Earlier I mentioned the famous conflict 
between Truman and MacArthur over how to fight the Korean War. 
MacArthur strongly believed that the best strategy involved bombing 
Chinese targets across the Yalu River, but Truman vetoed that strategy (and 
fired MacArthur) because he feared it might draw the USSR into the 
war.324 That is a political, not a military, conclusion, and the decision to 
avoid rather than provoke war with the USSR is likewise a political 
decision. Similarly, during the Cuban missile crisis, “President Kennedy 
personally supervised the location of each U.S. Navy vessel involved in the 
blockade,”325 lest an admiral’s narrowly tactical decision spook 
Khrushchev and inadvertently launch World War III. And it was Truman 
rather than a military officer who made the most politically fraught of all 
tactical decisions: the choice to drop the A-bomb on Hiroshima.326 Though 
many of us condemn the decision on moral, legal, or political grounds, it 
seems obvious that it belonged in the hands of civilian officials rather than 
military officers. It had enormous political consequences, inaugurating the 
nuclear age and the Cold War. 
But even lesser decisions can implicate politics. Churchill intervened 
in a technical dispute among his military advisors over the deployment of 
air power before the Normandy invasion because he realized that 
minimizing French civilian casualties was politically crucial, and he 
wanted to ensure that casualty-avoidance figured in the military 
calculations.327 In exactly the same way, tactical choices that inflict 
unintended civilian casualties carry vast political risks in the current Iraq 
war—although in this case the political leadership initially failed to 
appreciate the magnitude of the risks. 
Virtually any operational or tactical choice may have deeply political 
consequences, and that is why civilian leaders should not be barred in 
principle from intervening in military decisionmaking. That is ultimately 
why the president’s post as commander in chief must remain efficient 
rather than dignified. 
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But it does not follow, either logically or practically, that most or even 
many operational choices in fact are political in a sense relevant to the 
president’s expertise, nor (therefore) that presidents or other civilian 
leaders should routinely intrude in military command. Nor does it follow 
that the president’s intrusion has anything to do with military expertise 
rather than political judgment; or that the president’s political judgment is 
better than that of other elected officials; or that the president’s political 
choices trump those of Congress; or that every issue the president claims is 
political really is.328 
To be sure, in a counterinsurgency war like the current Iraq conflict, 
military strategy includes a political component, as military commanders 
forge alliances and cut deals with local leaders in order to win them away 
from supporting the insurgents. In such a war, military expertise is political 
to a high degree. But on the ground wheeling and dealing with local 
chieftains over endless cups of tea is a different order of politics than the 
traditional executive branch conduct of foreign affairs. It can intrude on 
foreign affairs, if a military commander makes improvident commitments 
on behalf of his government. Those will be the cases that call for civilian 
political intervention. Mostly, though, the captains and colonels on the 
ground will understand the local politics better than civilians in 
Washington do. 
Furthermore, not all presidential political ends are “high” politics 
having to do with foreign policy or military grand strategy. Presidents may 
make military choices because of a “low” domestic political agenda.329 
Johnson opted for remaining in Vietnam but gradually escalating (and 
disguising the escalation) to smooth over his reelection and make it easier 
to enact Great Society programs.330 Roosevelt initially hoped to postpone a 
pre-World War II military buildup because he feared it might hurt his 
reelection chances.331 (However, his military advisor General George C. 
Marshall stood up to Roosevelt and persuaded him to change his mind.)332 
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Even Lincoln urged a summer 1864 victory in Atlanta partly to bolster his 
reelection chances.333 According to many sources, Bush administration 
legal strategies about detainees were molded by a preexisting agenda of 
enhancing executive power.334 
These are clearly not the kind of political ends that either Clausewitz 
or Huntington have in mind when they argue that a nation’s military 
strategy must be subservient to its political strategy. They are thinking of 
foreign policy, not domestic power struggles. Indeed, when politicians 
make military choices to bolster their own desire for political power, we 
face exactly the concerns that preoccupied the framers—the dangerous 
interaction between military leadership, hunger for power, and 
adventurism.335 The unremarkable fact that modern presidents seek power 
and political advantage shows that the framers’ concerns about the political 
exploitation of military command by civilian leaders are alive and well in 
the twenty-first century. 
Once we recognize that some, but not necessarily many, military 
choices have a political dimension in the sense relevant to Huntington’s 
argument, it becomes clear that the president’s effective power as 
commander in chief is fully consistent with the basic Huntingtonian 
framework in which politics is left to the politicians while military choices 
are mostly left to the military, although with civilian monitoring and the 
possibility of civilian intervention. It should also be clear that low politics 
is not a good enough reason for a civilian commander to make military 
 
 333. COHEN, supra note 112, at 242. 
 334. Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at 
A1, A12. Regarding the pro-executive-power prior agenda, see, for example, Chitra Ragavan, Cheney’s 
Guy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 29, 2006, at 32, available at http://www.usnews.com/ 
usnews/news/articles/060529/29addington.htm; James Taranto, A Strong Executive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
28, 2006, at A8, available at http://home.nyc.rr.com/taranto/cheney.htm. See generally SAVAGE, supra 
note 258, at 46–84 (describing executive power agenda of unitary executive enthusiasts). 
 335. Cohen defends the inclusion of “low” domestic politics among the legitimate reasons for 
leaders to intervene in military decisions, but only when they also have “high” military purposes. See 
COHEN, supra note 112, at 242. But it is important to tread carefully in this argument. Cohen writes, 
“President Lincoln wants a victory at Atlanta in the summer of 1864 in order to crush the 
Confederacy—but also to boost his own chances of reelection, which in turn is necessary for the 
ultimate victory of the Union.” Id. (emphasis added). The italicized phrase goes too far. The example is 
unconvincing; despite McClellan’s less than stellar command earlier in the war, there is no reason to 
suppose that he would have lost or conceded the war had he been elected; he repudiated the antiwar 
plank of his party’s platform. See A. Wilson Greene, “I Fought the Battle Splendidly”: George B. 
McClellan and the Maryland Campaign, in ANTIETAM: ESSAYS ON THE 1862 MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 
56, 56–83 (Gary W. Gallagher ed., 1989); 1 WILMER L. JONES, GENERALS IN BLUE AND GRAY: 
LINCOLN’S GENERALS 85, 86 (2004). Probably every president thinks that his continuation in power is 
necessary, but that is delusion. 
  
2008] COMMANDER IN CHIEF POWER 557 
 
decisions. That would violate the moral compact at the heart of civilian 
control of the military. 
F.  AFTER HUNTINGTON 
How has Huntington’s framework fared in the half century since he 
proposed it? As I indicated earlier, Huntington’s emphasis on military 
professionalism and objective civilian control remains the dominant 
perspective on civilian-military relations. But, like all academic theories, it 
has had its ups and its downs.336 One observer notes that “by the mid 
1990s, Huntington was no longer taught in core curricula at West Point nor 
in the Army’s schools and had not been for a decade or so.”337 But he adds 
that in the late 1990s, faced with a troubling sense of eroding 
professionalism in the officer corps, the Army began to renew its interest in 
Huntington’s thesis.338 
The problems of the 1990s grew from the end of the Cold War, which 
led both to military downsizing and loss of clarity about the military’s 
mission. Would it now be humanitarian interventions such as Somalia, 
peacekeeping and policing missions as in Bosnia, training of indigenous 
forces as in Colombia and the Philippines, sanction enforcement as in Iraq, 
or other kinds of MOOTW (military operations other than war)?339 None of 
these falls within the core of military expertise, and the boundaries of 
professional jurisdiction began to fray.340 Furthermore, many officers 
wondered whether these were missions worth dying for, a concern 
mirroring the post-Mogadishu perception by political leaders that casualty 
avoidance and force protection had now become central to the military 
mission.341 At the same time, the Revolution in Military Affairs meant a 
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much more hi-tech and information-centered conception of the military; 
and that, together with the ideology of privatization, entailed that a large 
number of support functions were outsourced.342 Privatization, like 
MOOTW, poses a threat to the jurisdictional boundaries of the military 
profession. Moreover, as private military contractors successfully competed 
for the services of trained officers, the professional ideals of altruistic 
service and corporateness seemed threatened by a commercial alternative. 
Together, these factors generated the crisis of professionalism that military 
observers perceived. 
The Afghanistan and Iraq wars have exacerbated some of these 
tensions (such as concern about private military contractors343) and 
alleviated others (no one today thinks that force protection is the main 
military mission, and the two post-9/11 wars have given pride of place to 
the primary military expertise of “boots on the ground”). It has become 
clear since the 1990s that the questions of military professionalism and 
military ethics are once again central, not peripheral, to contemporary 
affairs. Huntington’s questions have emerged from their temporary eclipse. 
The structure of American military forces has not followed 
Huntington’s recommendation of a balanced pattern. Huntington proposed 
a line of authority running from the president to the secretary of defense—
both of whom would make political but not military decisions—to the 
highest military officer (presumably the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), 
who would serve a dual role as the civilian officials’ top military advisor 
and the armed forces’ top commander. The current organization of the U.S. 
armed forces, established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, differs 
significantly from Huntington’s balanced pattern. Under Goldwater-
Nichols, the JCS Chair is indeed the chief advisor, but is forbidden from 
exercising command.344 The line of command runs from the president to 
the secretary of defense and then directly to the combatant commander of 
an operation. The main purpose of Goldwater-Nichols was to end the 
poisonous interservice rivalries that had made military advice from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff ineffectual in Vietnam; under the new statute, the JCS 
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Chair is the sole authorized advisor (although the other Chiefs often give 
Congressional testimony).345 In this respect, the legislation aimed to restore 
some heft to military advice. Nevertheless, Huntington would presumably 
regard this pattern as dangerously unbalanced, because it invites civilian 
leaders to bypass their chief military advisors and supervise combatant 
commanders directly. Indeed, in one of the most significant blunders 
during the run-up to the Iraq War, the civilian leadership ignored Army 
Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki’s estimate (given in Congressional testimony) 
that it would take hundreds of thousands of troops to pacify postwar Iraq; 
Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz publicly rebuked Shinseki for 
his testimony, which turned out to be right.346 It was not the first such 
episode; a few weeks after 9/11, the Chair of the JCS retired, “disgusted 
with Rumsfeld and feeling he had recklessly disregarded sound military 
advice.”347 
Even under Goldwater-Nichols, though, the assumption until recently 
had been that the combatant commander, not the president or defense 
secretary, is the efficient military leader in a conflict. Indeed, until 2002 
combatant commanders were titled “commanders in chief.” Significantly, 
in October 2002, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prohibited 
that terminology, on the ground that under the Constitution only the 
president is commander in chief.348 In one sense, this was a purely verbal 
change; but the implication behind it is plainly the assertion of a more 
domineering form of civilian command than the Huntingtonian separation 
of functions. Rumsfeld was surely signaling that the civilian leadership, not 
the military, would call the shots in the upcoming Iraq war. 
Peter Feaver notes that Huntington’s most important empirical 
prediction—that unless the United States abandoned liberalism it would 
lose the Cold War—turned out to be completely false; and Feaver develops 
an alternative model of civilian-military relations based on the economic 
theory of principals and agents.349 Feaver argues that civilian control 
succeeds best when civilian leaders monitor and discipline the military 
intrusively. But in fact his model retains the underlying division of labor in 
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Huntington’s theory: civilians make political decisions, while the military 
executes them and tenders military advice.350 Feaver’s chief innovation is 
the added insight that maintaining this division of labor often requires 
intrusive civilian monitoring of the military, in order to solve the principal-
agent problem.351 This should be regarded as a modification of the “third 
way” rather than a radical alternative to it. Although critics have rightly 
rejected some of Huntington’s theory—as I have as well—the core of his 
reformulation remains largely unscathed.352 
More recently, however, Eliot Cohen in Supreme Command has 
offered a more fundamental criticism of Huntington’s model.353 Cohen’s 
influential book aims to replace Huntington’s insistence that “military 
command stops at the level of the military chief”354 with a far more 
aggressive version of civilian control. His arguments are important for us to 
consider, not only because of their high quality, but also because Cohen 
offers a far more upbeat view of an active, hands-on civilian supreme 
commander—one that comes closer to the warrior-executive of 
consolidationism. It thus poses a significant challenge to the narrower view 
of the commander in chief power that I have claimed forms the unwritten 
background understanding of the Commander in Chief Clause. Cohen’s 
book was on President George W. Bush’s reading list the summer 
preceding the Iraq War—a period in which high administration officials 
made momentous decisions about war and detainee treatment in notable 
disregard of military opinion.355 
We have already examined one of Cohen’s arguments—that politics 
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pervades military decisions. The response was that just because some 
military decisions have strategic political implications, it does not follow 
that all do, or even that many do. If this were Cohen’s only argument, it 
would not significantly dent Huntington’s theory. Like Feaver’s advocacy 
of intrusive monitoring, it would imply only that maintaining the correct 
balance between civilian and military jurisdictions requires civilians to 
address principal-agent problems. 
But the core of Cohen’s argument is not that all military decisions are 
inherently political. It is that active, participatory civilian leadership makes 
even purely military decisions better. Cohen bases his argument on four 
case studies of brilliant civilian leadership in wartime—Lincoln, 
Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion—and argues that their nearly 
continuous intervention in military affairs was essential to military success 
in the wars they faced. The method of argument is as striking as the 
content. By focusing on supreme civilian leaders who played glorious roles 
in their nations’ history, and arguing that their heroic roles included 
supreme military command, Cohen implicitly invites us to reimagine the 
civilian commander in chief on consolidationist lines, as a heroic fighting 
executive. 
Of course, one might reply that Cohen has biased his study by picking 
four extraordinarily great leaders. But Cohen anticipates that reply, and 
argues that even “leadership without genius” is likely to do better in 
wartime by taking an aggressive rather than deferential stance toward the 
military.356 Taking Huntington as his explicit target, Cohen advocates a 
robust, hands-on vision of supreme civilian-military command. 
I do not believe that Cohen makes his case. For one thing, on careful 
examination his case studies prove less than Cohen thinks they do, even on 
their own terms.357 None of them reveals a civilian leader coming close to 
acting as supreme military commander. None of the four played Gröfaz. 
Thus, Cohen argues that Lincoln was personally responsible for devising 
the Union’s successful war strategy. But most of the elements Cohen 
includes in Lincoln’s war strategy are straightforwardly political rather than 
military, and therefore not really in issue. These include deciding that the 
war aim was restoration of the Union, manipulating to ensure that the war 
began with an act of Southern aggression, and keeping the European 
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powers out of the war.358 Likewise, Clemenceau’s World War I roles in 
uplifting French morale, negotiating the armistice, and maintaining the 
alliance belong fundamentally to a civilian politician’s portfolio rather than 
that of a military commander; his primary military role, though far from 
insignificant, was deciding which of his two commanding generals’ 
strategies to support.359 As for Churchill, Cohen acknowledges that his 
operational ideas were often boneheaded, and defends him largely by 
pointing out that “despite having the supreme power to act as he wished, he 
allowed himself to be talked out of every one of them”360—more a 
counterexample than a proof of Cohen’s thesis. And in Ben-Gurion’s case, 
Cohen focuses on his extraordinary role at the birth of the Israeli state in 
creating the defense forces out of politicized, fragmented, more-or-less 
amateur militias—a remarkable feat, but not one with lessons that readily 
generalize to established states with professional militaries. Ben-Gurion’s 
challenge, after all, was creating a professionalized military, not 
supervising one.361 
Cohen does succeed in showing that these were each active, rather 
than passive civilian commanders, who took enormous interest in the 
details of the war efforts and monitored their military leaders intrusively— 
prodding them, peppering them with questions, refusing to accept 
conventional wisdom. He also shows that by choosing generals, civilian 
leaders indirectly choose strategies. What he does not show is that any of 
these leaders ignored military advice, overruled their military leaders’ 
considered judgments on operational matters except on rare occasions, or—
except in the case of Lincoln—laid claim to extraordinary war powers.362 
Nor does Cohen succeed in showing that the aggressive civilian 
control he favors will improve military outcomes even when the leader 
lacks the genius of a Lincoln or a Churchill. Indeed, when he analyzes the 
qualities that made his four exemplary statesmen successful, he identifies 
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capacities that more mediocre leaders conspicuously lack. These include 
“intuition that stands well above the norm in human affairs,”363 “mastery of 
military detail” acquired through “prodigious study”364 (requiring a 
commitment of time that no modern president has), “exceptional judgment 
of other men,”365 and “the ability to see things as they are, ‘without 
illusions.’”366 Cohen notices that “[n]ations are led and ruled by words, and 
each of these men, deeply read in history, politics, and literature, had 
mastered the arts of speech and writing on a level beyond all but the most 
gifted orators and authors”367—but he fails to notice that this undercuts the 
case for leaders who lack comparable abilities. Any leader blessed with 
masterly judgment, military knowledge, inspiring rhetorical gifts, and 
ruthless abstinence from self-deception is a genius. If Cohen’s thesis asserts 
that civilian leaders can improve military outcomes by intrusive command, 
but only if they have the qualities he enumerates, it turns out to be a 
stronger argument against intrusive civilian command than for it. By 
definition, middling leadership rather than genius is all we are entitled to 
expect from our presidents. 
Cohen’s principal case study for the usefulness of aggressive civilian 
control even by mediocre leaders is the Vietnam War, where he argues that 
failure resulted from underintrusive rather than overintrusive leadership.368 
But, inconsistently, he also maintains that “the American politicians failed 
as war leaders in Vietnam not because they immersed themselves in too 
much detail but because they looked at the wrong details and drew the 
wrong conclusions from them.”369 In other words, they failed because of 
their amateurism, not their underintrusiveness. And, despite Cohen’s 
argument that they did not intervene enough, it seems undeniable that the 
civilian leaders micromanaged the Vietnam War to an astonishing degree. 
It was not just a matter of Johnson picking bombing targets. The Secretary 
of Defense’s office also picked targets, as well as specifying the weather 
conditions for carrying out the missions and the level of training required 
of the pilots.370 At one point McNamara personally decided “whether the 
forces in Vietnam were to be reinforced by two C-141 cargo aircraft,” 
while Johnson personally decided whether to reinforce the half-million 
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troops on the ground with three more battalions.371 Martin van Creveld 
attributes this astonishing absorption of the civilian leadership in minutiae 
to a badly designed command structure, rather than a desire to play 
Gröfaz.372 Regardless of the cause, however, and regardless of whether 
Johnson and McNamara were asking enough skeptical questions of their 
generals, they cannot be accused of taking a hands-off approach to the war. 
This case study does not offer much reassurance that aggressive leadership 
by amateurs is an idea to embrace. 
Cohen’s most telling argument is that even if civilian leaders make 
bad generals, military leaders also get military matters badly wrong, and it 
is a mistake to put their professional judgment on a pedestal.373 That may 
well be true. It should not surprise us; as Feaver observes, “the military is 
perhaps the only profession that never really gets a chance to practice,” 
only to rehearse or simulate.374 Militaries are notorious for fighting the last 
war rather than the current war.375 All the more reason for a civilian leader 
to engage in probing interrogation of military advice. 
This deflationary, unworshipful argument about the limits of military 
expertise is entirely plausible, but we must be careful what conclusions to 
draw. Military fallibility is not a strong argument for meddling by mediocre 
civilian leaders. No matter how badly skewed military judgment is, we 
have no reason to suppose that civilian judgment will be better. The issue is 
one of comparative advantage, not of the absolute soundness of military 
judgment. A second problem lies in the lopsided way Cohen sets up his 
contrasts. He studies civilian leaders of genius, and mediocre leaders 
coupled with mediocre generals; but he never asks what happens when 
mediocre civilian leaders second-guess and override good military advice 
by excellent generals. 
Ultimately, what Cohen shows is the importance of an active, 
questioning, and intelligent approach by civilian leaders toward military 
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advice. This is important, and to the extent that Huntington suggests 
otherwise Cohen’s correction is welcome. It will come as no surprise to 
students of professions such as medicine and law, where research over the 
years has repeatedly confirmed that pushy, questioning, squeaky-wheel 
patients and clients get better service than dormant, docile ones.376 But 
probing and questioning are not the same as taking over; and active civilian 
superintendence—what Cohen aptly labels “the unequal dialogue” between 
civilian and military leaders377—is not the same as civilian supreme 
command. It may be that Cohen really intends to offer only a modest case 
for “unequal dialogue,” consistent with Feaver’s argument for intrusive 
civilian monitoring of military command, and not a call for heroic 
leadership. If so, however, his conclusions are far closer to Huntington’s 
idea of objective civilian control than they are to the consolidationist notion 
of “supreme command.” 
One more point deserves emphasis. Huntington’s theory, no less than 
that of the eighteenth century, assumes that the point of the Commander in 
Chief Clause is to establish civilian control of the military—as opposed, for 
example, to the Macedonian system of fused dominion, where the point 
was to pick the greatest warrior as king. Its purpose is to control and 
channel power, not to enhance it. Huntington’s question, like those of 
Feaver and Cohen, is how best to achieve civilian control. None of them 
supposes the Commander in Chief Clause conveys anything more than 
authority over the military. For each of them, therefore, the Commander in 
Chief Clause creates a narrow power of military command, not a broad, 
exclusive power in matters of national security. 
V.  CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.  CONSEQUENCES 
This Article has not focused on issues of constitutional doctrine; it 
aims instead to think about how they might be approached. The approach 
is, in a broad sense, historicist. The text of the Commander in Chief Clause 
fuses civil and military dominion; it does so with few words and no 
explanations. Faced with a spare, minimalist constitutional text, the 
interpreter must ask why governments choose fused dominion, and why, in 
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particular, this government chose it. Answering those questions will expose 
the unwritten understanding that gives meaning to the underspecified 
concepts in the text. Fused dominion has meant different things in heroic 
and feudal cultures, in military dictatorships, and in liberal republics; its 
meaning has changed somewhat between the American republics of the 
eighteenth and twenty-first century. Military technology and tactics, social 
institutions, forms of government, and political ideologies have all 
contributed to the shapes fused dominion assumes, and for the historicist its 
meaning cannot be understood apart from these. The interpretive error I 
mean to ward off is, for want of a better word, anachronism. 
The particular form of anachronism at stake here is imposing a 
concept of fused dominion drawn from heroic and feudal societies onto a 
liberal republic, dangerously overinflating the image of the commander in 
chief. In a liberal republic, the purpose of fused dominion is not to 
consolidate supreme civil and military powers in the hands of a single 
individual to facilitate warmaking, but to control the ambitions of leaders 
and domesticate warriors. 
Of course it would also be anachronistic to suppose that the political 
debates of a small eighteenth-century republic with a tiny army of 
musketeers still make sense in a continental republic possessing 
apocalyptic military power. The purpose for examining theories of civil-
military relations of the last half century was to guard against this 
anachronism. Huntington’s argument, which I have accepted in part (and 
with amendments drawn from Feaver and Cohen) is that separation of 
functions is now a more urgent problem than separation of powers. But, 
even accepting this conclusion, the form of fused dominion remains largely 
the same: civilian leaders control or (in Barron and Lederman’s word) 
superintend the military378—and can do so quite actively—but their role as 
commander in chief does not include broader warmaking powers. 
Although I have not focused on doctrinal issues, this approach may 
carry doctrinal consequences. “May carry,” not “carries”: as Holmes said, 
general propositions do not decide particular cases, and the propositions 
defended here are quite general.379 To say that the commander in chief 
authority is narrow does not say how narrow it is, and it would be a mistake 
to suppose we could read the commander in chief’s rights and duties 
directly off of the concepts of separationism or military professionalism. In 
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a sense, the main doctrinal consequence of this paper consists of shifting 
the burden of proof, so that proponents of broad presidential war powers 
can no longer simply wave their hands and invoke the president’s “inherent 
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.”380 If a power is not that 
of military command, the presumption should be that the Commander in 
Chief Clause does not entail it. 
With this in mind, I shall list a few possible consequences in a 
conclusory way; this is not the place to delve into details and 
counterarguments. 
(1) The first consequence is one to which I have already alluded. The 
fact that the civilian commander in chief does not hold dual office by 
virtue of military competence means that other branches of 
government need not defer to a presidential decision based on their 
supposedly inferior military competence. 
(2) Recall our earlier discussion of Judge Mukasey’s opinion in the 
Padilla case. He correctly noticed that a judge’s institutional 
competence to decide on the basis of evidence whether Padilla was an 
unlawful enemy combatant was at least as great as the competence of 
the executive branch; but he nevertheless deferred because making the 
determination did not belong to his commission. That conclusion 
supposes that making such determinations does belong to the 
commission of the commander in chief. But that seems wrong. The 
president’s commission is narrowly military, and Padilla’s arrest and 
classification had no earmarks of the military about them. Even the 
battlefield determination whether captives in a foreign theater of war 
are enemy combatants or civilians is basically a matter of matching 
evidence with criteria—a fundamentally judicial task, rather than a 
combat competence of the military. 
(3) There is no reason to suppose that the president’s military 
powers—other than the power of command—are preclusive. Civilian 
control of the military does not imply exclusively executive control. 
Thus, it is perfectly possible that Congress and the president have 
concurrent authority over some decisions.381 If, for example, the 
commander in chief wants to interrogate a wartime captive under 
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torture, but Congress has enacted a statute prohibiting torture, there is 
no reason to believe that Congress has infringed on preclusive 
presidential war powers. 
(4) For that reason, and because the president is bound by the Take 
Care Clause, the commander in chief override simply does not follow 
from the Commander in Chief Clause. 
(5) Likewise, there is no reason to suppose that the president can order 
military personnel to violate the laws of war, any more than any other 
military commander can. Under both domestic and international laws 
of war, soldiers receiving illegal orders are bound to disobey them. 
B.  CONCLUSION: THE PULL OF MILITARISM  
At the beginning of this Article, I cautioned that a dangerous 
consequence of misunderstanding the restrained, limited role of the civilian 
commander in chief might be militarism, and I wish to conclude by 
returning to this caution. In a sense, it underlies the Article’s fundamental 
contrast between consolidationism and separationism. 
By militarism, I mean—following Andrew Bacevich—“a 
romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the 
truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding 
the efficacy of force.”382 Gerhard Ritter puts it in slightly more general 
terms: “The problem of militarism is the question of the proper relation 
between statesmanship as an art and war as a craft. Militarism is the 
exaggeration and overestimation of the military, to a degree that corrupts 
that relation.”383 German militarists in the Weimar and Nazi periods liked 
to invert Clausewitz’s famous formula: rather than war being politics by 
other means, politics “‘is the continuation of war by other means in 
peacetime.’”384 Along similar lines, Carl Schmitt defined politics as 
conflict between friend and enemy, with combat as an ever-present 
possibility.385 These are classically militarist understandings of politics. 
Few observers will doubt the strong militarist strain in contemporary 
America, a pendulum swing from the antimilitarist sentiments prevailing at 
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the end of the Vietnam War. It arises from several factors.386 First was the 
painstaking and successful effort of the U.S. military to restore its prestige 
and capability after Vietnam. Moving to an all-volunteer force improved 
the qualifications and morale of personnel. Second, with the collapse of the 
USSR, the possibility for conventional war as a geopolitical strategy 
suddenly seemed brighter, because the risk of precipitating a nuclear war 
was slim. Furthermore, the invention of precision-guided munitions seemed 
to make limited wars possible at acceptable levels of civilian casualties. 
The test came with the first Gulf War, and it amounted to a vindication of 
the U.S. military fifteen years after Vietnam. The Gulf War was soon 
followed by the nearly casualty-free victory in Kosovo. Both were 
(arguably) just wars. And both seemed to many to demonstrate the 
invincibility of the U.S. military. Indeed, in the 1990s, more Red Cross 
workers were killed in action than U.S. Army personnel.387 Public esteem 
for military men and women (fueled by retrospective shame over the 
shabby treatment of Vietnam veterans) has never been higher. All the 
elements of militarism were in place. 
September 11 added the ingredient of fear to the mix. Militarism made 
it seem obvious that the campaign against terrorism should be 
conceptualized as a war, and that the capture, detention, and interrogation 
of terrorists and alleged terrorists was an exercise of “war powers.” By 
now, years of litigation and thousands of pages of debate have made clear 
that each of these propositions is in fact highly controversial, both legally 
and morally. If they did not seem so initially, it was because the violent 
atrocity of 9/11 seemed to demand a decisive response, and Americans had 
come to identify decisive action with military action. The emergency 
likewise seemed to justify broad war powers. They were the contemporary 
equivalent of the one extraordinary presidential war power the framers 
recognized: to respond on his own authority to sudden attacks without 
waiting for a congressional declaration of war. 
The invocation of emergency war powers marks the point where the 
danger of an overinflated commander in chief power looms large. In a time 
of crisis, the president forms a natural rallying point, and it is easy to forget 
that the president is not actually a military commander in the efficient 
sense. In the early weeks after 9/11 the two most visible responses—the 
Afghan war and the round-up of foreign Arabs within the United States—
seemed like aspects of a single campaign organized swiftly by the 
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executive branch. The round-up could be assimilated to the war. Compared 
with the enormity of 9/11, claims of violated civil liberties seemed hollow 
and incidental, easily brushed off by assertions of emergency war powers. 
This is still true six years later; thus, for example, in 2006 the Department 
of Justice tried to justify the National Security Agency’s conduct of 
warrantless wiretaps prohibited by FISA on the basis of “the President’s 
well-recognized inherent constitutional authority as Commander in 
Chief.”388 
The butcher’s bill and endless frustrations of the Iraq war may have 
cooled some Americans’ military ardor, and perhaps induced second 
thoughts about the invincible efficacy of military action. But at the same 
time, the fact that the antiterrorist campaign is being waged side by side 
with two Middle Eastern shooting wars in which the enemy often uses 
terrorist tactics lends continued credence to the idea that antiterrorist 
powers are “war powers.” Militarism, and the consolidationist reading of 
the president’s commander in chief power, feed into each other and amplify 
each other. So long as the Long Emergency beginning on September 11 
continues, emergency powers packaged as war powers will encroach on 
rights Americans have long taken for granted.389 
It will not pass unnoticed that the situation I have just described—a 
long emergency in which exceptions displace rules—is the very form fused 
dominion takes in military dictatorships. Although the parallel is striking, I 
am not offering a backhand argument that America is verging on military 
dictatorship, nor that the ambitious reading of the Commander in Chief 
Clause favored by the Bush administration is a gateway to military 
dictatorship. None of the encroachments of the past six years comes close 
to the level that the framers and ratifiers feared—military coup or 
presidential seizure of power. The dangers are subtler. Alexis de 
Tocqueville—so often an acute observer of American democracy—perhaps 
put it best: 
 Any long war always entails great hazards to liberty in a democracy. 
Not that one need apprehend that after every victory the conquering 
generals will seize sovereign power by force after the manner of Sulla 
and Caesar. The danger is of another kind. War does not always give 
democratic societies over to military government, but it must invariably 
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and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government; it must 
almost automatically concentrate the direction of all men and the control 
of all things in the hands of the government. If that does not lead to 
despotism by sudden violence, it leads men gently in that direction by 
their habits. 
 All those who seek to destroy the freedom of the democratic nations 
must know that war is the surest and shortest means to accomplish this. 
That is the very first axiom of their science.390  
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